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Article 
To Drink the Cup of Fury:  Funeral Picketing, Public 
Discourse, and the First Amendment 
STEVEN J. HEYMAN 
In Snyder v. Phelps, the Supreme Court ruled that the Westboro Baptist 
Church had a First Amendment right to picket the funeral of a young soldier killed 
in Iraq.  This decision reinforces a view that has become increasingly dominant in 
First Amendment jurisprudence—the view that the state may not regulate public 
discourse to protect individuals from emotional or dignitary injury.  This Article 
contends that this view not only sacrifices the law’s protections for individual 
personality but also undermines the normative foundations of public discourse 
itself.  The Article then presents an alternative theory of the First Amendment 
which holds that the same values of human dignity and autonomy that support free 
speech also give rise to other fundamental rights.  Thus, speakers should have a 
duty to respect the personality and rights of others.  Drawing extensively on the 
record in Snyder as well as on other materials, the Article argues that Westboro’s 
funeral picketing should not receive First Amendment protection, for the picketing 
is intended to condemn the deceased and to inflict severe distress on the mourners 
in violation of their rights to privacy, dignity, emotional well-being, and religious 
liberty.  Finally, the Article shows that although Westboro prevailed in Snyder, 
this may prove to be a Pyrrhic victory, for the Court also suggested that states can 
protect mourners through carefully drawn buffer-zone laws. 
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To Drink the Cup of Fury:  Funeral Picketing, Public 
Discourse, and the First Amendment 
STEVEN J. HEYMAN
*
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
How far does the First Amendment’s protection for freedom of speech 
extend?
1
  May the law ever restrict speech because it causes emotional or 
dignitary injury to others?  These were the central questions in the 
Supreme Court’s recent decision in Snyder v. Phelps.2  On March 3, 2006, 
a young Marine named Matthew Snyder was killed in the line of duty in 
Iraq.
3
  One week later, Pastor Fred Phelps Sr. and several of his followers 
from the Westboro Baptist Church (“Westboro”) picketed Matthew’s 
funeral in Westminster, Maryland.
4
  The demonstrators held up signs 
emblazoned with slogans like “Thank God for Dead Soldiers,” “God Hates 
Fags,” “You’re Going to Hell,” and “America is Doomed.”5  These signs 
reflected Westboro’s belief that God was killing American soldiers to 
punish the nation for tolerating homosexuality and other conduct that the 
church regarded as sinful.
6
   
Matthew’s father, Albert Snyder, brought suit against Westboro and its 
members for the anguish that he suffered from their picketing of the 
funeral.
7
  A federal jury held the defendants liable for the torts of 
intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”) and invasion of 
privacy and awarded Snyder five million dollars in compensatory and 
                                                                                                                          
* Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology.  A.B. 1979, 
J.D. 1984, Harvard.  For thoughtful comments on earlier versions of this Article, I am grateful to Kate 
Baldwin, Felice Batlan, Mary Jean Dolan, Tom Lewis, Thomas McAffee, Mark Rosen, Christopher 
Schmidt, Adrian Walters, Christina Wells, and the participants in the Chicago-Kent Legal Theory 
Workshop.  Sarah Marfisi provided invaluable research assistance.   
In 2010, I served as an advisor to the plaintiff’s lawyers in Snyder v. Phelps after the case reached 
the Supreme Court.  The views expressed in this Article are solely my own.  
1 The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or 
the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of 
grievances.”  U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
2 Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1215 (2011). 
3 Snyder v. Phelps, 533 F. Supp. 2d 567, 571 (D. Md. 2008), rev’d, 580 F.3d 206 (4th Cir. 2009), 
aff’d, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011). 
4 Id. 
5 131 S. Ct. at 1213.  
6 Id. 
7 Id. at 1214.  
 106 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:101 
punitive damages.
8
  In March 2011, however, the Supreme Court 
overturned this award on First Amendment grounds.
9
  Writing for the 
majority, Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. acknowledged that Westboro’s 
picketing had “inflict[ed] great pain” on Matthew’s father and that “its 
contribution to public discourse may [have been] negligible.”10  
Nevertheless, Chief Justice Roberts maintained that the protesters had 
addressed the public as a whole on matters of public concern while 
standing on public property that was located a considerable distance from 
the funeral.
11
  Under these circumstances, he held that the picketing was 
entitled to the “special protection” that the First Amendment affords to 
speech on matters of public concern.
12
 
The Chief Justice was careful to note that the decision was a “narrow” 
one that was “limited by the particular facts before [the Court].”13  But the 
significance of the case goes far beyond that.  Funeral picketing inflicts 
greater pain and distress on its targets than virtually any other form of 
expression.  Thus, Snyder is likely to be regarded as a leading authority for 
the view that the First Amendment generally bars the state from restricting 
the content of speech on public issues in order to protect individuals from 
emotional or dignitary injury.  Of course, there is nothing novel about this 
view—in recent decades, it has become the dominant position in First 
Amendment jurisprudence.
14
  As the Snyder case shows, however, this 
position is deeply problematic, for it requires the Court to protect speech 
even when it causes great harm and makes little or no “contribution to 
public discourse.”15   
In this Article, I criticize the Snyder decision and the conception of 
free speech on which it is based.
16
  After summarizing the decision in Part 
                                                                                                                          
8 Id.  Damages initially were set at $10.9 million, but on a post-trial motion the district court 
judge reduced the award to five million.  Id. 
9 Id. at 1215. 
10 Id. at 1220. 
11 Id. at 1217–20. 
12 Id. at 1219. 
13 Id. at 1220.  
14 See infra Part IV.A. 
15 Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1220. 
16 For some valuable discussions of Snyder and the broader issue of funeral picketing, see Clay 
Calvert, Defining “Public Concern” After Snyder v. Phelps:  A Pliable Standard Mingles with News 
Media Complicity, 19 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 39 (2012) (discussing the concept of public concern in 
First Amendment jurisprudence); Stephen R. McAllister, Funeral Picketing Laws and Free Speech, 55 
U. KAN. L. REV. 575 (2007) (discussing funeral picketing legislation); Njeri Mathis Rutledge, A Time 
to Mourn: Balancing the Right of Free Speech Against the Right of Privacy in Funeral Picketing, 67 
MD. L. REV. 295 (2008) (analyzing the balance between the interest in mourning and the right of free 
speech); Deana Pollard Sacks, Snyder v. Phelps, the Supreme Court's Speech-Tort Jurisprudence, and 
Normative Considerations, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 193 (2010) (exploring the conflict between freedom 
of speech and the right to be let alone); Christina Wells, Regulating Offensiveness: Snyder v. Phelps, 
Emotion, and the First Amendment, 1 CALIF. L. REV. CIRCUIT 71 (2010) (arguing that courts should not 
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II, I argue in Part III that the majority fundamentally misunderstood the 
nature of Westboro’s funeral picketing.  As the group’s own statements 
make clear, the message of God’s hatred is not simply addressed to the 
public in general; it is also directed toward the mourners in particular.  As 
Shirley Phelps-Roper has explained, Westboro’s goal is to “put[] the cup of 
the fury and wrath of God to your lips and [to make] you drink it.”17  The 
real issue in cases like Snyder is whether there is a First Amendment right 
to address speech of this sort to the mourners at a funeral and thereby cause 
them profound emotional distress.   
The majority did not directly confront this issue because it failed to 
appreciate the fact that Westboro’s speech was directed to the mourners as 
well as to the public at large.  However, the Court did articulate a view of 
the First Amendment that generally would preclude the state from 
regulating public-concern speech in order to protect individual dignity and 
personality.
18
  In Part IV, I argue that this view not only gives short shrift 
to those values, but also tends to undermine the sphere of public discourse 
itself by negating the practical and normative conditions on which it 
depends.   
In Part V, I outline an alternative theory of the First Amendment that 
seeks to overcome these problems.  According to this view, which I shall 
call the liberal humanist approach, public discourse should not be 
understood as a realm in which all standards of civility and respect have 
been suspended, or as a marketplace that is capable of operating on its own 
and neutralizing harmful expression.  Instead, we should understand public 
discourse as discussion among persons who recognize one another as free 
and equal members of a self-governing community.  On this view, the right 
to free speech carries with it a duty to respect the personality and rights of 
others.   
                                                                                                                          
recognize a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress based on offensive speech); Christina 
E. Wells, Privacy and Funeral Protests, 87 N.C. L. REV. 151 (2008) (examining the impact of funeral 
protest statutes on free speech); Benjamin C. Zipursky, Snyder v. Phelps, Outrageousness, and the 
Open Texture of Tort Law, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 473 (2001) (defending Snyder’s claim for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress); Ronald K.L. Collins & David Hudson, A Funeral For Free Speech?, 
LEGAL TIMES (Apr. 17, 2006) available at http://archive.firstamendmentcenter.org/analysis.aspx?id=16
775 (exploring whether funeral protests can be outlawed without violating the right to free speech);  
and the articles in the online symposium Funerals, Fire, and Brimstone, CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO, 
http://www.cardozolawreview.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=category&layout=blog&id=
21&Itemid=26.  On the regulation of funeral picketing after Snyder, see Mark Strasser, Funeral 
Protests, Privacy, and the Constitution:  What is Next After Phelps?, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 279 (2011);  
Christina E. Wells, Regulating Funeral Protests After Snyder v. Phelps (Mar. 12, 2012) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with author) [hereinafter Wells, “After Snyder”]. 
17 Hannity & Colmes (Fox News television broadcast Apr. 18, 2006), transcript available at 
http://media.pfaw.org/Right/PhelpsInterview.txt (interview by Sean Hannity and Alan Colmes with 
Shirley Phelps-Roper). 
18 See infra Part IV.A.  
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In more general terms, the liberal humanist view holds that freedom of 
speech exists within a broader framework of rights, all of which are rooted 
in respect for human freedom and dignity and are intended to promote the 
full development and flourishing of human nature.  The First Amendment 
should not be interpreted to protect speech that violates the rights of other 
people, except in situations where the value of the speech outweighs the 
value of the other rights with which it conflicts. 
The Article then applies this theory to funeral picketing.  In the interest 
of clarity, I begin in Part VI with the paradigmatic case of funeral 
picketing—a situation in which the protesters stand so close to the funeral 
that they are able to communicate with the mourners in a direct and 
immediate way.  I argue that such picketing causes serious injury to the 
mourners and violates their rights to emotional well-being, privacy, 
dignity, and religious or spiritual liberty.  The value of the speech does not 
warrant the injuries that it causes, because the protesters are not justified in 
communicating directly with the mourners and there is no need to stand so 
close to a funeral to communicate with the public at large.  For these 
reasons, the First Amendment should not protect funeral picketing in its 
paradigmatic form. 
In Part VII, I consider whether, under the liberal humanist approach, 
we should reach the same conclusion on the facts of Snyder itself.  This is a 
much more difficult case because the protesters could not be seen or heard 
from the church where the service took place.  However, Westboro’s 
members regarded themselves as picketing the funeral; they could be seen 
from the procession; they sought to convey an intensely hateful message to 
the mourners; they succeeded in communicating this message, albeit in an 
indirect way; and their conduct resulted in severe emotional and dignitary 
injury.  Once again, they lacked sufficient justification for acting as they 
did.  On these grounds, I would hold that their actions were not protected 
by the First Amendment.  At the same time, I agree with the majority that 
one of the requirements for IIED liability—a jury determination that the 
defendants’ conduct was “outrageous”19—is simply too vague a standard to 
govern cases involving speech that to a substantial extent involves matters 
of public concern.  Thus, although I believe that a state could restrict the 
defendants’ conduct in Snyder without running afoul of the First 
Amendment, I agree that this conduct should not give rise to tort liability 
for IIED.   
Finally, in Part VIII, I argue that the Court was right to suggest that the 
First Amendment allows the state and federal governments to enact buffer-
zone laws that require protesters to stand a certain distance away from 
                                                                                                                          
19 Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1219; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965) [hereinafter 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND)]. 
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funerals, and I contend that this position should be interpreted broadly to 
uphold laws that require the protesters to stand out of the mourners’ sight 
and hearing, as the Court found that they did in Snyder itself. 
II.  THE SUPREME COURT’S OPINION IN SNYDER 
After describing the events surrounding Matthew Snyder’s funeral, 
Chief Justice Roberts identified the critical issue as whether Westboro’s 
speech was related to matters of public concern and thus entitled to the 
highest level of First Amendment protection.
20
  To answer this question, he 
focused on the content of the speech.
21
  The signs that Westboro displayed 
read as follows: 
“God Hates the USA/Thank God for 9/11,” “America is 
Doomed,” “Don’t Pray for the USA,” “Thank God for IEDs,” 
“Fag Troops,” “Semper Fi Fags,” “God Hates Fags,” 
“Maryland Taliban,” “Fags Doom Nations,” “Not Blessed 
Just Cursed,” “Thank God for Dead Soldiers,” “Pope in 
Hell,” “Priests Rape Boys,” “You’re Going to Hell,” and 
“God Hates You.”22 
After quoting these signs, Chief Justice Roberts observed that:  
While these messages may fall short of refined social or 
political commentary, the issues they highlight—the political 
and moral conduct of the United States and its citizens, the 
fate of our Nation, homosexuality in the military, and 
scandals involving the Catholic clergy—are matters of public 
import.  The signs certainly convey Westboro’s position on 
those issues, in a manner designed . . . to reach as broad a 
public audience as possible.
23
   
Chief Justice Roberts conceded that “a few of the signs—such as ‘You’re 
Going to Hell’ and ‘God Hates You’—[could be] viewed as containing 
messages related to Matthew Snyder or the Snyders specifically.”24  But he 
insisted that “the overall thrust and dominant theme of Westboro’s 
demonstration spoke to broader public issues.”25 
The Chief Justice then rejected the notion that the context in which the 
speech occurred should lead the Court to treat it as private rather than 
public: “The fact that Westboro spoke in connection with a funeral . . . 
                                                                                                                          
20 Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1215. 
21 Id. at 1216–17. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. at 1217.   
24 Id.  
25 Id. 
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cannot by itself transform the nature of Westboro’s speech.”26  He 
acknowledged that Westboro chose to picket where it did “to increase 
publicity for its views” and that this “choice added to Mr. Snyder’s already 
incalculable grief.”27  But that did not change the fact that “Westboro 
conducted its picketing peacefully on matters of public concern at a public 
place adjacent to a public street.”28  Like public streets and sidewalks, this 
space amounted to “a traditional public forum” that under longstanding 
doctrine could be freely used for “public assembly and debate.”29 
The Chief Justice recognized that the Court had previously “identified 
a few limited situations where the location of targeted picketing can be 
regulated under provisions that the Court has determined to be content 
neutral.”30  For example, in Frisby v. Schultz,31 the Justices upheld a ban on 
targeted picketing in front of a person’s home,32 while in Madsen v. 
Women’s Health Center, Inc.,33 they approved an injunction establishing a 
buffer zone around the entrance to an abortion clinic.
34
  According to Chief 
Justice Roberts, however, Snyder was clearly distinguishable in two 
respects.  First, the nature and the location of the activity were quite 
different than in the earlier cases: 
Simply put, the church members had the right to be where 
they were.  Westboro alerted local authorities to its funeral 
protest and fully complied with police guidance on where the 
picketing could be staged.  The picketing was conducted 
under police supervision some 1,000 feet from the church, 
out of the sight of those at the church.  The protest was not 
unruly; there was no shouting, profanity, or violence.
35
 
Second, in cases like Frisby and Madsen, the restrictions were found to 
satisfy the requirements of content neutrality.
36
  By contrast, Chief Justice 
Roberts maintained that “[t]he record [in Snyder] confirms that any distress 
occasioned by Westboro’s picketing turned on the content and viewpoint 
of the message conveyed, rather than [on] any interference with the funeral 
itself.”37  This point is made clear by the fact that “[a] group of 
                                                                                                                          
26 Id. 
27 Id. at 1217–18. 
28 Id. at 1218. 
29 Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
30 Id.  
31 487 U.S. 474 (1988). 
32 Id. at 488.  
33 512 U.S. 753 (1994). 
34 Id. at 776. 
35 Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1218–19.  It is unclear why Roberts did not consider the repeated use of 
the word fag on the picket signs profane. 
36 Id. at 1218. 
37 Id. at 1219. 
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parishioners standing at the very spot where Westboro stood, holding signs 
that said ‘God Bless America’ and ‘God Loves You,’ would not have been 
subjected to liability.”38   
For the majority, it followed that Westboro could not be held liable 
without violating one of the most basic doctrines of free speech 
jurisprudence:  that speech on public issues “cannot be restricted simply 
because it is upsetting or arouses contempt.”39  Under the First 
Amendment, the government may never “‘prohibit the expression of an 
idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.’  
Indeed, ‘the point of all speech protection . . . is to shield just those choices 
of content that in someone’s eyes are misguided, or even hurtful.’”40   
According to the Court, these principles were especially threatened in 
the present case because liability for IIED requires a finding that the 
defendant’s conduct was “outrageous.”41  The use of such a subjective and 
“highly malleable standard” poses a serious risk that juries will impose 
liability for speech that they dislike or are offended by—a risk that is 
“unacceptable” where the freedom of public debate is at issue.42 
On these grounds, the Court rejected the plaintiff’s IIED claim.43  His 
claim for invasion of privacy fared no better.
44
  Snyder argued that 
Westboro’s speech should not be protected because he “was a member of a 
captive audience at his son’s funeral.”45  In response, Chief Justice Roberts 
wrote:  
In most circumstances, “the Constitution does not permit the 
government to decide which types of otherwise protected 
speech are sufficiently offensive to require protection for the 
unwilling listener or viewer.  Rather, . . . the burden normally 
falls upon the viewer to avoid further bombardment of [his] 
sensibilities simply by averting [his] eyes.”46 
                                                                                                                          
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) and Hurley v. Irish-
Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 574 (1995)). 
41 Id.  
42 Id.  On this point, the Court drew on its earlier decision in Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 
U.S. 46 (1988), which held that outrageousness did not provide a sufficiently objective basis for 
imposing liability on the publisher of a parody that ridiculed a public figure.     
43 Id.  
44 See id. at 1219–20. 
45 Id. (citing Brief for Petitioner at 45–46, Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011) (No. 09-
751)). 
46 Id. at 1220 (quoting Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 210–11 (1975) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
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This rule can be overcome only by “‘a showing that substantial privacy 
interests are being invaded in an essentially intolerable manner.’”47  No 
such showing could be made here, the Court said, because “Westboro 
stayed well away from the memorial service,” and “there is no indication 
that the picketing in any way interfered with the funeral service itself.”48 
Although the Chief Justice stressed the narrowness of the decision, he 
ended by articulating its broader meaning: although speech is “powerful” 
and is capable of “inflict[ing] great pain,” our nation has “chosen . . . to 
protect even hurtful speech on public issues to ensure that we do not stifle 
public debate.”49  At the same time, he indicated that the government may 
be allowed to adopt buffer-zone laws that restrict the location of funeral 
picketing, so long as those laws are content neutral and satisfy the 
standards that the Court has articulated for time, place, and manner 
regulations.
50
  
In dissent, Justice Samuel A. Alito contended that Westboro’s speech 
went “far beyond commentary on matters of public concern” and 
constituted a “vicious verbal assault” on Matthew Snyder and his family.51  
“Our profound national commitment to free and open debate,” he argued, 
does not require us to protect this sort of speech.
52
  In a concurring opinion, 
Justice Stephen G. Breyer agreed with Justice Alito that the state should 
sometimes have the power to protect against abusive speech.
53
  In this case, 
however, Westboro’s speech had occurred “in a place where picketing was 
lawful,” it “could not be seen or heard from the funeral ceremony itself,” 
and only the tops of the signs could be seen from the procession.
54
  Justice 
Breyer concluded that, under these circumstances, a decision upholding the 
tort judgment “would punish Westboro for seeking to communicate its 
views on matters of public concern without proportionately advancing the 
State’s interest in protecting its citizens against severe emotional harm.”55 
                                                                                                                          
47 Id. (quoting Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971)). 
48 Id. 
49 Id.  In this way, as Frederick Schauer remarks, Snyder represents one of “the clearest 
[statements] the Court has ever issued . . . about the extent to which the First Amendment protects even 
personally harmful speech.”  Frederick Schauer, Harm(s) and the First Amendment 14 (Univ. Va. Law 
Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Series No. 2012-23), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2030444.   
50 Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1218. 
51 Id. at 1222 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
52 Id.  
53 Id. at 1221 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
54 Id. at 1221–22.  
55 Id. at 1222. 
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III.  A CRITIQUE OF THE SNYDER OPINION 
The majority opinion in Snyder rests on the following propositions:  
(1) that Westboro’s picketing took place on public property far from the 
church and had little if any impact on the funeral; (2) that the expression 
was not a personal attack on the Snyder family but was addressed to the 
public on matters of public concern; and (3) that any emotional distress 
caused by the speech was based on its content and viewpoint.  If one 
understands the facts in this way, Snyder is an easy First Amendment case 
which can be resolved by a straightforward application of conventional 
doctrine, and which is remarkable only because of the intense passions that 
it generates.  As I shall now show, however, each of these three 
propositions is highly problematic.   
A.  The Location of the Speech 
The majority stressed that Westboro’s members “fully complied with 
police guidance on where the picketing could be staged” and that they 
stood “at a public place adjacent to a public street” which was “some 1,000 
feet from the church, out of the sight of those at the church.”56  In this way, 
the opinion implies that the protesters were required to stand in a remote 
location and that their conduct did not encroach on the funeral in any way.  
This view of the facts is misleading in several respects.   
First, Westboro itself played a significant role in determining where 
the protest took place.  The funeral was held at St. John’s Catholic Church, 
which consists of a number of buildings spread across a large campus in 
Westminster, Maryland.
57
  The street address is 43 Monroe Street.
58
  
Westboro learned of Matthew Snyder’s death and the location of his 
funeral from obituaries published in local news sources.
59
  The group then 
notified the local authorities that it intended to picket at 43 Monroe Street, 
and the authorities—in consultation with a priest from St. John’s—made 
arrangements for the group to demonstrate at that site.
60
  Thus, Westboro’s 
picketing took place “at the main entrance” to the St. John’s campus, 
                                                                                                                          
56 Id. at 1218. 
57 An aerial photograph of the church campus is reproduced in Supplemental Joint Appendix at 
SA-1, Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011) (No. 09-751) [hereinafter Aerial Photograph].   
58 ST. JOHN WESTMINSTER, http://www.sjwest.org (last updated Dec. 1, 2011). 
59 Brief of Appellants, Appendix at 1945, Snyder v. Westboro Baptist Church, Inc., 580 F.3d 206 
(4th Cir. 2009) (No. 08-1026) [hereinafter Record] (opening statement of Shirley Phelps-Roper at trial).  
I am grateful to the plaintiff’s counsel, Sean Summers, Esq., and his staff for making the record 
available to me.   
60 See Letter from Shirley Phelps-Roper to Chief Jeffrey Spaulding, Westminster Police Dep’t 
(Mar. 8, 2006), in Record, supra note 59, at 3776; Record, supra note 59, at 2244–46 (testimony of Fr. 
Leo Patalinghug); Record, supra note 59, at 2281–82 (testimony of Maj. Thomas Long of Carroll 
County, Maryland Sheriff’s Office). 
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although the funeral service itself was held at a building at the opposite end 
of the campus.
61
   
Second, the trial testimony indicates that while the small strip of land 
on which the demonstration was held “technically . . . belongs to the 
county,” it is located immediately adjacent to the church’s property, 
appears to belong to that property, and is maintained by the church.
62
  
Third, although the funeral procession to the church normally would have 
used the main entrance, the clergy arranged for the procession to take an 
alternative route “[b]ecause we knew that there were going to be protesters 
at the main entrance” and “we didn’t want to have a confrontation” 
between the protesters and the family.
63
  Even so, as the majority 
acknowledged, the procession passed within 200 to 300 feet of the 
protesters.
64
  Albert Snyder testified that he saw the tops of the picket signs 
as the procession turned into the church campus, and that he had already 
learned that there would be protesters at the funeral.
65
   
Fourth, the Court’s assertion that the protesters were standing 
“approximately 1,000 feet” from the building where the funeral occurred 
arguably is also overstated.
66
  Finally, Westboro’s announcement that it 
would picket the funeral led to the deployment of a number of law 
enforcement and emergency vehicles, as well as to the gathering of a 
substantial media presence—facts that, in the plaintiff’s view, contributed 
to a “circus-like atmosphere during a solemn and religious occasion.”67 
To be sure, none of these facts undermines the majority’s contention 
that the protesters were standing too far away to affect the funeral 
ceremony itself.  But they do call into question the idea that the protest had 
no impact on the atmosphere surrounding the funeral.  
B.  The Audiences for the Speech and the Messages That It Was Meant to 
Convey 
The lynchpin of the Court’s analysis is the contention that Westboro’s 
picketing related to matters of public concern and that it was not a personal 
                                                                                                                          
61 Record, supra note 59, at 2244 (testimony of Fr. Leo Patalinghug); Aerial Photograph, supra 
note 57. 
62 Record, supra note 59, at 2242–43 (testimony of Fr. Leo Patalinghug).   
63 Id. at 2244. 
64 Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1213 (2011). 
65 Record, supra note 59, at 2074–75 (testimony of Albert Snyder). 
66 Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1213.  In preparation for the trial, the defendants measured the distance by 
walking along a series of paths that do not run directly from the protest site to the church.  See Aerial 
Photograph, supra note 57.  One of the measurements they obtained was 1,081 feet.  Id.  Using the 
same photograph, I would calculate the distance as approximately 800 feet as the crow flies. 
67 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 2–3, Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011) (No. 09-751); 
Record, supra note 59, at 2082 (testimony of Albert Snyder).   
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attack on the Snyder family.
68
  The majority’s discussion of this point is 
intertwined with another question that it does not clearly distinguish: who 
was the intended audience for the speech?  On this point, the majority 
speaks as though the picketing was directed “to society at large,” and it 
barely considers whether the speech was also directed to the family and 
other mourners.
69
  These two points account for much of the force of the 
Court’s argument—if speech is directed toward the public and relates to 
matters of public concern, then clearly no private individual should be able 
to interfere with it merely because he finds it upsetting.  In this way the 
majority seems to treat Albert Snyder, rather than Westboro, as the 
interloper in this situation. 
In this respect, the Court’s view of the case is deeply distorted.  An 
exploration of Westboro’s own statements, both in this case and elsewhere, 
shows that its funeral picketing is addressed to—and directed against—not 
only the community in general but also the family and mourners in 
particular.   
To understand Westboro’s activity, we need some understanding of its 
theology and sense of its own mission.
70
  Westboro is a Primitive or Old 
School Baptist church which was founded in Topeka, Kansas in 1955.
71
  
The church has about sixty members, most of whom are related by blood 
or marriage to its founder and pastor, Fred Phelps Sr.
72
  The church 
subscribes to an extreme form of Calvinism, which holds that human 
nature has become utterly fallen and corrupt as a result of the sin of 
Adam.
73
  The total depravity of mankind manifests itself in all forms of sin 
and especially in “sodomy,” which Westboro regards as a fundamental and 
primordial transgression of God’s law.74  All human beings are deserving 
                                                                                                                          
68 Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1216–18. 
69 Id. at 1216–17. 
70 The best account can be found in an ethnographic study of the group conducted by Rebecca 
Barrett-Fox over a six-year period.  See Rebecca Barrett-Fox, “Pray Not for this People for Their 
Good”: Westboro Baptist Church, the Religious Right, and American Nationalism, chs. 3–4 (Dec. 8, 
2010) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Kansas), available at http://kuscholarworks.ku.ed
u/dspace/bitstream/1808/7738/1/BarrettFox_ku_0099D_11255_DATA_1.pdf (discussing Westboro’s 
theology, ministries, and mission); see also Wells, “After Snyder,” supra note 16, at 6–9 (explaining 
Westboro’s theology and practices). 
71 Westboro Baptist Church, Who Are You, What Do You Do, and Why Do You Do It?, 
GODHATESFAGS, http://godhatesfags.com/faq.html#Who (last visited Mar. 16, 2012); Barrett-Fox, 
supra note 70, at 39, 137. 
72 Barrett-Fox, supra note 70, at 103–05. 
73 Id. at 155–56. 
74 Id.  Westboro’s view of sodomy is rooted in Old Testament verses that call it an “abomination,” 
see Leviticus 20:13, 22, as well as in the first chapter of St. Paul’s Letter to the Romans, which declares 
that because human beings turned away from God and fell into idolatry, God “gave them up to 
uncleanness through the lusts of their own hearts, to dishonour their own bodies between themselves,” 
especially through same-sex relations,  Romans 1:18–27 (King James).   
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of eternal damnation, but God, in a sovereign act of grace and mercy, has 
elected to save a small number from the flames of hell.
75
   
Westboro’s members believe “that they are the only contemporary 
group that accurately understands and lives out God‘s commands, and are 
thus the only people who have a reason to hope that they will enter 
heaven.”76  The church is “the lone prophet of God’s word” and has been 
appointed to preach the gospel of God’s wrath to the world.77  As Pastor 
Phelps explained at trial, the group believes that it has a duty not merely to 
proclaim this message to the public in general, but also to “go into the 
highways and the hedges . . . and the byways” and to “preach the gospel to 
every creature,” “[w]hether they want to hear it or not.”78  The goal of this 
activity is not to convert others or to save their souls, for the church 
accepts a “hyper-Calvinist” doctrine of predestination which holds that 
God decided before the creation of humanity whom to save and whom to 
damn.
79
  If an individual is destined for perdition, there is nothing that he 
or anyone else can do to change that fact.
80
  Accordingly, Westboro does 
not call on sinners to repent, nor does it offer them salvation or pray for 
them to be saved.
81
  Although the church’s members hope that their words 
will bring some unknown members of the elect to God, they preach the 
message “not to help people find eternal salvation but to reveal to the 
world God’s message of impending damnation.”82   In this way, they act in 
obedience to God’s command and thereby gain some further assurance of 
their own election.
83
   
Picketing is the “primary method” by which the church spreads its 
message.
84
  Of course, this is a method that is designed to communicate not 
only with the public but also with the specific targets.  That is 
unquestionably true of the picketing that Westboro conducts at locations 
other than funerals.  For example, the church’s website announced that, 
                                                                                                                          
75 See Barrett-Fox, supra note 70, at 156–69 (discussing the Calvinist belief in limited 
atonement). 
76 Id. at 128. 
77 Id. at 216, 227–30. 
78 Record, supra note 59, at 2215, 2226 (testimony of Fred Phelps Sr.). 
79 See Barrett-Fox, supra note 70, at 160–64. 
80 Id. at 190.  
81 See id. at 141 n.405, 157, 190.  Barrett-Fox reports that, in a recent sermon, Pastor Phelps 
imagined a bystander at one of Westboro’s pickets asking, “‘What can we do?’”  Phelps’s reply was:  
“‘Nothing.  God is through with you.  I’m through with you.  Westboro Baptist Church is through with 
you.’”  He “rather gleefully” added,  “‘We’re going to pray for you—that you’ll go to hell, that you’ll 
be smitten.’”  Barrett-Fox, supra note 70, at 159 (quoting Fred Phelps, Sermon (Feb. 7, 2010)).   
82 Barrett-Fox, supra note 70, at 222, 229–30. 
83 Id. at 229.  
84 Westboro Baptist Church, What Ways Have You Found to Spread Your Message?, 
GODHATESFAGS, http://www.godhatesfags.com/faq.html#SpreadMessage (last visited June 27, 2012). 
 2012] TO DRINK THE CUP OF FURY  117 
during a particular week in June 2011, its members would picket the 
following places (among others):  
 a rock concert in Seattle, in order to convey “a message for those 
in attendance” about the evils of homosexuality;85  
 an evangelical church in Auburn, Washington, to communicate a 
message that “[y]ou have caused the people to trust in lies to their 
destruction, and to your [own] damnation”;86 
 a feminist march against rape called SlutWalk Seattle, to tell the 
participants that “if you’d quit dressing like sluts, you wouldn’t be 
treated like sluts,” and that “every rape is a punishment from God 
and a judgment upon you for your sins”;87 and  
 a United Jewish Fund event in Springfield, Illinois, “to preach 
some gospel truth . . . to the reprobate Jews.”88 
According to Randall Balmer—a leading American religious historian who 
was called by Westboro itself as an expert witness in the Snyder case—
when the church’s members engage in demonstrations of this sort, they 
seek to “confront” specific individuals “who [are] in particular need of 
some message,” and to do so in a way that is “militant, in your face, 
confrontational, [and] condemnatory.”89   
In the case of funeral picketing, the individuals who are being 
confronted are the mourners.  As Westboro explained in a 2005 open letter 
to lawmakers, the group is determined to “deliver [its] message to the 
people going to these events, whether inside or out.  That’s our intended 
audience . . . .”90   
                                                                                                                          
85 Westboro Baptist Church Picket Schedule, http://www.godhatesfags.com/schedule.html (last 
visited June 16, 2011) (June 2011 version of the webpage on file with author).  
86 Id.  The “lies” in question were “that God love [sic] everyone and Jesus died for the sins of all 
of mankind.”  Id. 
87 Id.  
88 Id.  As Barrett-Fox explains, Westboro holds the Jews responsible for the death of Jesus and 
describes them as “‘famous worldwide for being fag-enablers, babykillers, pornographers, adulterers, 
fornicators, and greedy idolaters.’”  Barrett-Fox, supra note 70, at 249–56 (quoting Westboro Baptist 
Church, Naughty Figs, JEWSKILLEDJESUS.COM, http://www.jewskilledjesus.com/naughtyfigs). 
89 Record, supra note 59, at 2626, 2630 (testimony of Dr. Randall Balmer).  The defendants called 
Balmer as an expert witness to testify that both their theology and their confrontational approach were 
in accord with the tradition of American Christian fundamentalism—a characterization that Balmer 
supported, though he frankly added that Westboro “pushes [that approach] to the outer limit.”  Id. at 
2626. 
90 Westboro Baptist Church, A Message from Westboro Baptist Church (WBC) to Lawmakers on 
Legislation Regarding Her Counter-Demonstrations at Funerals of Dead Soldiers 4 (Dec. 12, 2005), 
http://www.godhatesfags.com/letters/20051212_legislation-message.pdf (last visited Mar. 16, 2012) 
[hereinafter Westboro, Message to Lawmakers] (emphasis added).  For this reason, the letter insisted 
that lawmakers would “go too far” if they established any buffer zone that was “more than about 100 
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At its core, Westboro’s funeral picketing is intended to condemn the 
deceased and to celebrate his death.  As the group’s website explains, “the 
scriptures specifically tell the servants of God to find comfort and rejoice 
in His punishment of the wicked”91—a category that, according to 
Westboro, includes everyone but a small group of God’s elect.92 
Another goal of Westboro’s funeral picketing is to hold “evil doers 
[such as the deceased or his family] up to public contempt, as a way to 
make an example of them so that others will not go that way, or engage in 
similar conduct.”93  In one of the most notorious incidents, Westboro 
picketed the funeral of Matthew Shepard, a gay college student who was 
tortured and murdered near Laramie, Wyoming in 1998, and proclaimed 
that he was in hell.
94
 
The news release that Westboro issued before the Snyder funeral 
shows that these were among the central messages of that protest as well.  
Entitled “Thank God for IEDs,” the news release asserted that Matthew 
had been killed by an IED (an improvised explosive device); that “[h]e 
died in shame, not honor—for a fag nation cursed by God”; and that he 
was now suffering eternal punishment in hell.
95
   
The picketing in Snyder was intended to condemn not only Matthew 
himself but also his parents.  This point emerges most clearly from an 
Internet posting entitled “The Burden of Marine Lance Cpl. Matthew A. 
Snyder,” which was written by Shirley Phelps-Roper several weeks after 
                                                                                                                          
feet” from a funeral.  Id.  A few months later, Westboro went further and denounced Maryland’s effort 
to establish a 100-foot buffer zone.  See infra text accompanying note 109. 
91 Westboro Baptist Church, Why Do You Have Signs Saying “Thank God for 911,” “Thank God 
for AIDS,” “Thank God for Katrina,” “Thank God for IEDs,” “Thank God for Dead Soldiers,” and 
Otherwise Thanking God for Things That Humans Think Are Bad?, GODHATESFAGS,  
http://godhatesfags.com/faq.html#Thank_God (last visited June 27, 2012). 
92 See Record, supra note 59, at 477 (testimony of Rebekah Phelps-Davis) (stating that “99.9% of 
the population of this world” is destined for hell); Barrett-Fox, supra note 70, at 128–30. 
93 Westboro Baptist Church, If God Hates Homosexuals as a Group, Why Do You Sometimes Aim 
Signs at Individual People, Not at the Group? How Can You Say That an Individual is in Hell?,  
GODHATESFAGS, http://godhatesfags.com/faq.html#Individuals (last visited June 28, 2012) [hereinafter  
Westboro, Individual People].  
94 See Achy Obejas, Student’s Funeral Becomes Unity Rally, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 17, 1998, at 1.  
Westboro’s website maintains a “‘perpetual[ ] memorial’” to Shepard which shows him burning in hell 
and warning viewers to listen to the church’s message.  See Barrett-Fox, supra note 70, at 242. 
95 Westboro Baptist Church, Thank God for IEDs (Mar. 8, 2006), in Plaintiff/Appellee’s Supp. 
Appendix at 158a, Snyder v. Westboro Baptist Church, Inc., 580 F.3d 206 (4th Cir. 2009) (No. 08-
1026) [hereinafter Westboro, News Release].  This document is reproduced as the Appendix to this 
Article.  See infra Appendix at p. 175.   
In fact, Westboro was mistaken about the cause of Matthew’s death.  At trial, Albert Snyder 
testified that his son was killed when the Hum-V on which he was riding “flipped and crushed him”; 
there is no indication that this event was caused by a road-side bomb.  Record, supra note 59, at 2063 
(testimony of Albert Snyder).  
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the funeral.
96
  This document, which the parties referred to as “the epic,” is 
Westboro’s own fullest account of the meaning of the protest. 
In a central portion of the epic, Westboro addressed Matthew’s parents 
directly: 
God blessed you, Mr. and Mrs. Snyder, with a resource and 
his name was Matthew . . . . In thanks to God for the comfort 
the child could bring you, you had a DUTY to prepare that 
child to serve the LORD his GOD—PERIOD!  You did 
JUST THE OPPOSITE—you raised him for the devil.97 
The epic then accused the Snyders of teaching Matthew “to defy his 
Creator, to divorce, and to commit adultery.”98  By raising him in the 
Roman Catholic Church, “[t]hey taught him how to support the largest 
pedophile machine in the history of the entire world.”99  Finally, Matthew’s 
parents “sent him to fight for the United States of Sodom, a filthy country 
that is in lock step with his evil, wicked, and sinful manner of life, putting 
him in the cross hairs of a God that is so mad He has smoke coming from 
his nostrils and fire from his mouth!  How dumb was that?”100 
Taken together, the news release and the epic indicate that the protest 
was intended to rejoice in Matthew’s death and to proclaim that God had 
struck him down and sent him to hell to punish him for his sinfulness, as 
well as to punish his parents for their own sins and for the way in which 
they had raised him.  These messages were expressed by many of the signs 
at the funeral, including “God Hates You,” “You’re Going to Hell,” “Not 
Blessed Just Cursed,” “Thank God for Dead Soldiers,” “Thank God for 
IEDs,” “God Hates Fags,” “Fag Troops,” and “Semper Fi Fags.”101  These 
messages were specifically addressed to the Snyders, among others, and 
were also intended to “hold [them] up to public contempt” to discourage 
others from following their example.
102
  
                                                                                                                          
96 Westboro Baptist Church, The Burden of Marine Lance Cpl. Matthew A. Snyder, in Record, 
supra note 59, at 3788 [hereinafter Epic]. 
97 Id. at 3791. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. 
100 Id.  In a later post, Westboro described Albert Snyder as “an evil man who was not content to 
go to hell quietly after miserably failing his family,” but who “added to his crimes in that he sued the 
servants of the true and living God.”  Record, supra note 59, at 2679–80 (testimony of Timothy Phelps, 
quoting statement posted on Westboro’s website). 
101 Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1216–17 (2011).  
102 Westboro, Individual People, supra note 93. Matthew was not gay and there is no evidence 
that Westboro believed that he was.  It might seem, then, that the last three signs were not directed at 
him personally, but only at the United States military or at soldiers who in fact were homosexual.  
Westboro’s members use fag in a broader sense, however.  As Timothy Phelps explained at trial, they 
define the term to include not only “those that are actually engaged in homosexual behavior,” but also 
“those who aggressively advocate for and enable it.”  Record, supra note 59, at 2348 (testimony of 
Timothy Phelps).  On these grounds Westboro considers “all elements of [the military to be] fags 
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Westboro’s picketing is directed not only toward the grieving family 
but also toward the other mourners.  On its website, the church explains 
that it pickets funerals “[t]o warn the people who are still living that unless 
they repent, they will likewise perish.  When people go to funerals, they 
have thoughts of mortality, heaven, hell, eternity, etc., on their minds.  It’s 
the perfect time to warn them of things to come.”103  Westboro 
acknowledges that, according to commonly accepted standards, its conduct 
may be regarded as “mean, hateful, [and] uncompassionate” toward the 
mourners, as well as “hateful and disrespectful of the dead.”104  The group 
replies, however, that according to its own standards “it would be infinitely 
more mean, hateful, [and] uncompassionate . . . to keep [our] mouth[s] shut 
and not warn you that you, too, will soon have to face God.”105 
Another target of the picketing in Snyder was the Catholic Church—
not only the Pope and the church in general, but also the particular parish 
in which Matthew had been raised and in which his funeral was held.  
Westboro’s news release stated that it would picket the funeral “at St. 
John’s Catholic dog kennel.”106  Likewise, the epic declared that God had 
“killed Matthew so that His servants would have an opportunity to preach 
His words to . . . the whorehouse called St. John Catholic Church.”107  At 
the funeral, Westboro’s anti-Catholic message was expressed by signs that 
read “Priests Rape Boys” and “Pope in Hell,” as well as by more general 
signs like “God Hates You” and “You’re Going to Hell.”108   
In many instances, Westboro’s funeral picketing is also addressed to, 
and directed against, the local community or state in which it takes place.  
One of the signs in this case read “Maryland Taliban”—a sign that was 
meant to denounce the Maryland legislature for considering a bill (which 
was later enacted) to prohibit demonstrations within 100 feet of a 
funeral.
109
  Westboro’s members brought this sign not only to Matthew’s 
funeral but also to the Maryland State House, where they protested on the 
same day.
110
  The epic declared that the State of Maryland was seeking “to 
blot out the word of God from the landscape,” and that God would respond 
by “blot[ting] out their young men.”111  Because the community rejected 
                                                                                                                          
including the troops,” and signs like “Fag Troops” are intended to refer to all soldiers.  Id. at 2332–33.  
The same point is made in a DVD entitled “Fag Troops” which Westboro submitted at trial.  Id. at 
3802–03. 
103 Westboro Baptist Church, Why Do You Picket Funerals?, GODHATESFAGS, 
http://www.godhatesfags.com/faq.html#Funeral (last visited July 7, 2012).  
104 Id. 
105 Id. 
106 Westboro, News Release, supra note 95. 
107 Epic, supra note 96, at 3793. 
108 Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1213 (2011). 
109 Id. at 1216; see also Record, supra note 59, at 2535 (testimony of Shirley Phelps-Roper). 
110 Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1213. 
111 Epic, supra note 96, at 3793. 
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the message that had been delivered to it by “[t]he servants of God,” “[i]t 
will be more tolerable for Sodom and Gomorrah in the Day of Judgment 
than for the people of Maryland.”112 
Finally, Westboro’s funeral picketing is addressed to, and meant to 
condemn, America as a whole.  As Pastor Phelps has explained, the signs 
seek to convey “the only righteous message for this evil nation that has 
gone the way of the Brokeback Mountain.  God’s wrath is upon this 
nation.  And he’s pouring out that wrath by killing these soldiers . . . and 
sending them back in body bags.  And it’s only going to get worse.”113 
In sum, the majority misconstrued the funeral picketing in Snyder 
when it asserted that Westboro was simply attempting to communicate 
with the public on matters of public concern such as the conduct and fate 
of our country.  Instead, the picketing was directed toward, and was meant 
to condemn, the Snyder family, the mourners, and the local religious 
community, as well as the state and the nation as a whole.
114
  As I shall 
now show, that is exactly how it was received.  
C.  The Basis for the Plaintiff’s Emotional Distress  
After focusing on the speakers and their message, the majority opinion 
moved on to the audience and how it received the speech.  “The record,” 
Chief Justice Roberts asserted, “confirms that any distress occasioned by 
Westboro’s picketing turned on the content and viewpoint of the message 
conveyed, rather than any interference with the funeral itself.”115  In this 
way, he suggested that the distress resulted simply from the controversial 
nature of the defendant’s religious and political views—something that 
clearly cannot justify a restriction on speech.
116
   
Remarkably, however, Chief Justice Roberts cited no evidence from 
“[t]he record” to support his assertion.117  In fact, the evidence goes the 
                                                                                                                          
112 Id.   
113 Interview by Michael Smerconish with Fred Phelps on Scarborough Country (Apr. 11, 2006) 
(transcript available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/12285618/ns/msnbc_tv-
morning_joe/t/scarborough-country-april/).  On its website, Westboro explains that it pickets soldiers’ 
funerals because “with full knowledge of what they were doing, they voluntarily joined a fag-infested 
army to fight for a fag-run country now utterly and finally forsaken by God who Himself is fighting 
against that country.” Westboro Baptist Church, Why Do You Picket Soldiers’ Funerals?, 
GODHATESFAGS, http://godhatesfags.com/faq.html#Soldier_Funeral (last visited July 7, 2012). 
114 It may even be said that Westboro’s picketing is intended to condemn the entire world, for the 
group believes that nearly all human beings are predestined for hell.  Indeed, on one of the church’s 
websites, a user can click on any part of an interactive map of the world to discover why God hates that 
particular country.  Westboro Baptist Church, GODHATESTHEWORLD.COM, 
 http://www.godhatestheworld.com/ (last visited July 7, 2012). 
115 Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1219. 
116 See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (“[T]he government may not prohibit the 
expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.”). 
117 See Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1219 (citing no evidence from the record).   
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other way.  To be sure, Albert Snyder testified that he disagreed with the 
views held by Westboro’s members, such as their condemnation of the 
United States and their belief that the Bible’s message is one of hatred 
rather than love.
118
  But he made clear that what upset him so deeply was 
not the general views that they held but the ways in which their conduct 
amounted to “an assault” on himself and his family.119 
Snyder testified that on (or shortly before) the morning of the funeral, 
he had heard “that there were going to be some protesters there from the 
Kansas church,” but that he did not know what the protest was about and 
did not give it much thought.
120
  As the procession turned into the church 
campus, he “saw the top of signs,” but he “couldn’t see what they said [or] 
who was holding them.”121  An hour or two after the burial, he was 
standing with some family and friends in his parents’ house when someone 
turned on the television to see the news.
122
  Snyder hoped to see the funeral 
procession and the tribute that had been paid to his son by the people who 
had lined the route.
123
  Instead, he was stunned to see Fred Phelps Sr. and 
Shirley Phelps-Roper expressing their hateful message.
124
  At this point, 
and also while reading the newspaper the next day, Snyder saw what was 
written on the signs.
125
   
Snyder testified that he was deeply upset by the signs that he 
interpreted to be an attack on his family.  For example, he understood 
“Thank God for Dead Soldiers” to mean that the protesters “were thanking 
God my son was dead,” and “You’re Going to Hell” to refer to Matthew 
since “[h]e was the only dead one there.”126  Similarly, he took “Fag 
Troops” to be an assertion that Matthew was gay.127  By contrast, Snyder 
testified that he was less bothered by signs like “God Hates the USA” and 
“God Hates Fags” because “they were more general” and were not directed 
                                                                                                                          
118 Record, supra note 59, at 2116, 2119, 2154 (testimony of Albert Snyder). 
119 Id. at 2131–32, 2145. 
120 Id. at 2074, 2078–79.  Snyder “thought they were going to be war protesters,” rather than what 
they turned out to be.  Id. at 2074. 
121 Id. at 2075.  
122 Id. at 2085, 2088. 
123 Id. at 2083, 2085.  For a description of this tribute, see infra notes 371–72 and accompanying 
text.  
124 Record, supra note 59, at 2085–86 (testimony of Albert Snyder).  Snyder explained that he 
was in such shock at that time that he could not recall the specifics of what the Phelpses had said.  Id.  
Presumably, it was along the same lines as other statements they made to the media that day.  For 
example, after asserting that Matt’s parents “hated him in life and they hated him in death,” Shirley 
Phelps-Roper said, “I think these soldiers [who] went into this war were volunteering, knew this is a 
nation that flips off God every day.  I say they all deserve death.  I say thank God for dead soldiers.”  
Id. at 2414–15 (newspaper article quoted during examination of Shirley Phelps-Roper). 
125 Id. at 2072, 2086–88 (testimony of Albert Snyder). 
126 Id. at 2086, 2113, 2119. 
127 Id. at 2087, 2120. 
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at his family.
128
  In short, Snyder’s emotional distress was caused not by 
his disagreement with Westboro’s general political or religious views, but 
by what he regarded as their unbelievably “cruel” and “heartless” conduct 
in causing pain to a family in mourning and taking “the dignity away 
from” Matthew’s funeral, thereby “tarnish[ing] the memory of my son’s 
last hour on earth.”129   
D.  Conclusion 
The Supreme Court fundamentally misunderstood the problem of 
funeral picketing in cases like Snyder.  Westboro did not merely hold a 
demonstration that was “planned to coincide with Matthew Snyder’s 
funeral”130a demonstration that was meant to address the public as a 
whole on issues of public concern, and that caused emotional distress only 
because of disagreement with the views it expressed on those issues.  
Instead, the Phelpses stood immediately adjacent to the church campus to 
“picket [the] funeral”131 in order to give thanks for Matthew Snyder’s 
violent death and to convey a message of God’s wrath to his family, 
friends, and religious community, as well as to the state and the nation.  
The plaintiff understood this message exactly as it was intended and 
thereby suffered severe emotional and dignitary injury.  The question 
posed by the case is whether the First Amendment should be interpreted to 
protect speech that causes this sort of injury.  The Court failed to come to 
terms with this issue, not only because of the way it read the record, but 
also because the Court’s approach to public discourse makes it very 
difficult to deal with problems of this sort.  
IV.  PUBLIC DISCOURSE IN CONTEMPORARY FIRST AMENDMENT 
JURISPRUDENCE 
In Snyder, the Court outlined a general view of the constitutional 
protections for public discourse, a view which the Justices have developed 
gradually over the past half-century and which is characteristic of 
contemporary First Amendment jurisprudence.  In this Part, I describe this 
view and argue that it suffers from fatal flaws and contradictions—
problems that clearly emerge when it is applied to funeral picketing. 
A.  The Supreme Court’s Approach to Public Discourse 
The Court’s approach rests on a basic distinction between public and 
private speech.  As Chief Justice Roberts explained in Snyder, speech on 
                                                                                                                          
128 Id. at 2116–17, 2120. 
129 Id. at 2072, 2114, 2187. 
130 Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1220 (2011). 
131 Westboro, News Release, supra note 95. 
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public affairs is essential to democratic self-government.
132
  For this 
reason, it “occupies the highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment 
values, and is entitled to special protection.”133  By contrast, the 
Constitution affords less rigorous protection to “speech on purely private 
matters” because restrictions on such speech do not pose a “threat to the 
free and robust debate of public issues” or interfere with “a meaningful 
dialogue of ideas.”134  
On this view, the First Amendment’s ban on censorship applies most 
strongly within the realm of public discourse.  According to the Court, 
“[t]he essence of this forbidden censorship is content control.”135  For this 
reason, laws that regulate speech on the basis of its content are treated as 
“presumptively invalid.”136   
More specifically, the Court has taken the position that the state 
generally may not restrict public-concern speech in order to protect other 
people from emotional or dignitary harm.
137
  Thus, in Hustler Magazine v. 
Falwell,
138
 the Court asserted that speech could not be restricted because it 
“may have an adverse emotional impact on the audience.”139  In Boos v. 
Barry,
140
 the Court held that the same principle barred the state from 
restricting speech to protect the “dignity” of other people.141  Instead, the 
Justices said that “in public debate . . . citizens [generally] must tolerate 
insulting, and even outrageous, speech in order to provide adequate 
breathing space to the freedoms protected by the First Amendment.”142   
In these decisions, the Court has been guided by Justice William J. 
Brennan Jr.’s statement in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan143 that the First 
                                                                                                                          
132 Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1215.   
133 Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
134 Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Although all of the Justices in Snyder 
seemed to accept these general principles, id. at 1216–17; id. at 1226–27 (Alito, J., dissenting), the 
Court merely paid them lip service a few months later in Brown v. Entertainment Merchants 
Association, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011).  There, a 5-4 majority struck down a law banning the sale to 
minors of ultraviolent video games which hardly purported to address public affairs.  Brown, 131 S. Ct. 
at 2732–33, 2741–42.  The majority subjected the law to the same strict scrutiny that the Court applies 
to laws restricting public-issue speech.  Id.  Taken together, Snyder and Brown lead one to wonder how 
seriously the Court takes its assertions about the distinction between public and private speech.   
135 Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972).  
136 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992).  For further discussion of the content-
neutrality doctrine, see infra Part V.D.   
137 For a powerful defense of this position, see Robert C. Post, The Constitutional Concept of 
Public Discourse: Outrageous Opinion, Democratic Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 
103 HARV. L. REV. 603 (1990).  I discuss Post’s view below.  See infra text accompanying notes  
265–78.   
138 485 U.S. 46 (1988). 
139 Id. at 55. 
140 485 U.S. 312 (1988). 
141 Id. at 322. 
142 Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
143 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
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Amendment embodies “a profound national commitment to the principle 
that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, 
and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes 
unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials.”144  As 
Justice Brennan later declared in Texas v. Johnson,
145
 “If there is a bedrock 
principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may 
not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea 
itself offensive or disagreeable.”146 
In all of these cases, the speech related to public figures (Hustler), 
public officials (New York Times), the government itself (Johnson), or 
foreign officials and governments (Boos).  But in some other decisions, the 
Court has extended these doctrines to speech that is directed against private 
persons.  For example, in NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co.,
147
 the Court 
held that speech did not lose its protected status simply because it might 
embarrass individuals or coerce them into supporting a civil rights 
boycott,
148
 while in Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, Inc.,149 the Court 
held that the First Amendment afforded some protection to insulting and 
abusive speech directed toward women entering abortion clinics or 
individuals who worked there.
150
  Snyder goes even further:  although it 
does not squarely confront the issue, it suggests that the First 
Amendment’s protections apply even to “vehement” and “caustic” speech 
that is directed against grieving family members who are about to bury a 
loved one.
151
  In this way, the Snyder opinion brings out the main features 
of the Court’s approach in a very clear and striking manner.  And it raises 
the question of whether that approach is in fact the best way to understand 
the freedom of speech.   
B.  A Critique of the Court’s Approach 
The Court’s current approach suffers from several serious problems.  
Here I shall discuss three of them:  (1) its use of abstract categories; (2) its 
protection of free speech at the expense of other important values; and (3) 
its tendency to undermine the foundations of public discourse itself.   
                                                                                                                          
144 Id. at 270.  
145 491 U.S. 397 (1989). 
146 Id. at 414. 
147 458 U.S. 886 (1982). 
148 Id. at 910. 
149 512 U.S. 753 (1994). 
150 Id. at 773–75. 
151 See Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1219 (2011) (stating that to allow juries to award 
damages for funeral picketing in cases like Snyder would pose an “unacceptable” risk of suppressing 
“vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasan[t] expression” that is protected by the First Amendment 
(citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).   
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1.  Abstraction 
The first difficulty with the Court’s approach lies in its use of abstract 
categories.  The Snyder majority insisted that “the overall thrust and 
dominant theme of Westboro’s demonstration” related to matters of public 
concern.
152
  For this reason, the speech could not be restricted simply 
because it caused pain or offense to the family.
153
  In dissent, Justice Alito 
objected that “this portrayal is quite inaccurate,” and that the personal 
attack on Matthew and his family was “of central importance.”154  As I 
have shown, however, Westboro’s speech had both public and private 
dimensions:  while the speech was meant to warn the nation of God’s 
wrath, it was also meant to tell the mourners that God had struck down 
Matthew and sent him to hell for “his evil, wicked, and sinful manner of 
life” and that they were headed for the same fate.155  Moreover, these two 
communications were deeply intertwined:  by confronting Matthew’s 
family, Westboro sought to gain widespread publicity for its views, while 
the condemnation of the Snyders was partly based on their connections to 
institutions such as the United States military and the Roman Catholic 
Church.  Signs like “Thank God for Dead Soldiers” contained general 
statements, but Westboro intended those statements to apply to Matthew in 
particular, and his family understood them in the same way.  Under these 
circumstances, it is fruitless to ask whether the speech is essentially a 
contribution to public discourse or essentially a personal attack:  both 
things are true at the same time.   
This point reveals the limitations of the Court’s approach, with its 
sharp distinction between public-concern and private-concern speech.  Of 
course, some First Amendment cases involve expression that clearly falls 
into the public category (such as the criticism of public officials in New 
York Times Co. v. Sullivan
156
) or into the private category (such as the 
credit-reporting service in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, 
Inc.
157
)  But cases like Snyder involve speech that straddles this divide.  In 
such cases, the use of these abstract categories is simply too crude a tool to 
allow for a thoughtful consideration of the values at stake.   
In Snyder, Chief Justice Roberts sometimes phrases the question as 
whether the speech related to “purely private matters.”158  Thus, he might 
respond that even if Westboro’s speech did constitute a personal attack, it 
still should be protected so long as it also related to matters of public 
                                                                                                                          
152 Id. at 1217. 
153 Id. at 1217–19. 
154 Id. at 1226–27 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
155 Epic, supra note 96, at 3791; see supra Part III.B. 
156 376 U.S. 254, 256 (1964). 
157 472 U.S. 749, 751 (1985). 
158 Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1215 (emphasis added). 
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concern.  This leads to the next problem I want to raise—that the Court’s 
approach unduly sacrifices other values to the protection of free speech. 
2.  Protecting Free Speech at the Expense of Other Fundamental 
Values 
In Snyder, the jury determined that Westboro had “maliciously” 
violated the plaintiff’s rights by intentionally or recklessly inflicting severe 
emotional distress through “extreme and outrageous” conduct, and by 
invading his privacy in a way that was “highly offensive to a reasonable 
person.”159  On appeal, Westboro did not dispute these findings, and the 
Supreme Court accepted them for purposes of the decision.
160
  Indeed, the 
Chief Justice recognized that Westboro’s conduct “inflict[ed] great pain” 
and “anguish” in a way that “added to Mr. Snyder’s already incalculable 
grief.”161  At the same time, Chief Justice Roberts conceded that the 
“contribution [of Westboro’s funeral picketing] to public discourse may be 
negligible.”162  Nevertheless, he concluded that the speech was entitled to 
First Amendment protection.  Such a position can only be described as 
tragic, for it holds that we can be faithful to one of our most cherished 
principles—freedom of expression—only by denying protection to 
individual personality, a value that (as I shall argue in Part V) is just as 
worthy of respect.   
3.  Undermining the Normative and Practical Conditions of Public 
Discourse 
A defender of the Court’s approach might reply that while the state 
should be allowed to protect individuals from some forms of abusive 
speech in the private realm, it may not do so in the public realm, for that 
would undermine the paramount value of democratic self-government.  
This argument is unpersuasive for two reasons.  First, in the American 
tradition, there is a deep connection between the idea of democracy and the 
idea of individual rights.  Democracy is the way in which free and equal 
individuals govern themselves on matters of common concern.  At the 
same time, one of the primary functions of democratic government is to 
protect individual rights.  It follows that individual rights should not be 
sacrificed to the value of democratic self-government except when there is 
a clear need to do so.   
Second, as I shall argue in the next Part, public discourse itself 
depends on mutual recognition and respect among citizens.  On one level, 
this is a practical requirement:  many individuals will feel alienated from 
                                                                                                                          
159 Snyder v. Phelps, 533 F. Supp. 2d 567, 570, 580–81, 589 (D. Md. 2008).   
160 Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1214 n.2. 
161 Id. at 1218, 1220. 
162 Id. at 1220.  
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and reluctant to participate in public discourse if it is not conducted in a 
way that affords them at least minimal respect as persons.  And mutual 
recognition is also a normative requirement because the outcome of public 
debate can be regarded as legitimate and binding only if it is conducted on 
this basis.   
These points are dramatically illustrated by the Snyder case.  The 
majority takes the position that the state may not protect individual 
personality in the public realm because “speech concerning public  
affairs . . . is the essence of self-government,” and because of the threat 
that regulation would pose to “a meaningful dialogue of ideas.”163  But 
what sort of “meaningful dialogue” could exist between the Westboro 
protesters and the mourners at a funeral?  To begin with, that is not the 
goal of funeral picketing.  As Westboro has stated: 
We are not really interested in a dialogue with you demon-
posessed [sic] perverts.  We are not out to change your 
minds, win your soul to Jesus, agree to disagree, find 
common ground upon which to build a meaningful long-term 
relationship, or any other of your euphemisms for 
compromising in our stance on the Word of God.
164
 
As for the mourners themselves, their focus is on remembering the person 
they have lost.  Under these circumstances, Westboro’s picketing, with its 
condemnation of the mourners and the deceased, and its celebration of his 
death, cannot be experienced as anything other than a brutal attack and a 
gross intrusion into their emotional and spiritual lives. 
It is true that the protesters are also trying to attract the attention of the 
community at large.  But they are deliberately doing so by means of an 
attack on the deceased and the mourners.  As I shall argue, at its deepest 
level, the community is founded on respect for the personality of all of its 
members.  It follows that community members are bound to experience 
Westboro’s picketing not as a legitimate contribution to public debate, but 
as an assault on their fellow citizens as well as on the community itself.   
Under these conditions, no “meaningful dialogue” is possible.  Indeed, 
the majority seemed to acknowledge this fact when it remarked that 
Westboro’s funeral picketing makes little or no “contribution to public 
discourse.”165  This statement can hardly rest on a wholesale assessment of 
Westboro’s religious and ideological views, such as the claim that America 
is violating God’s law and incurring divine wrath.  Whatever one thinks of 
such views, it is hard to deny that they are provocative and that they do 
                                                                                                                          
163 Id. at 1215 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
164 Barrett-Fox, supra note 70, at 23 (quoting Westboro Baptist Church, Contact Us,  
GODHATESTHEWORLD.COM, http://www.godhatesamerica.com/contact.html).   
165 Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1220. 
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make some contribution to public debate.  Thus, the majority’s statement 
seems to reflect the view that the church is expressing its beliefs in a 
manner that contravenes the most basic conditions of public discussion, 
and that this prevents the expression from being received as part of a 
meaningful exchange. 
In these ways, the Court’s current approach to public discourse is 
internally contradictory and self-defeating.  For both practical and 
normative reasons, public discourse depends on mutual respect among 
citizens.  When the Court insists on granting constitutional protection to 
speech that violates this principle, it not only sacrifices the value of 
individual personality but also undermines the conditions for democratic 
deliberation itself.  
V.  A LIBERAL HUMANIST THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
The root problem with the Supreme Court’s approach is that it fails to 
recognize that all of the values of a democratic society are ultimately 
founded on respect for the freedom and dignity of human beings.  What we 
need is a theory of the First Amendment that places those values at its 
center.  In this Part, I outline such a theory, which I call the liberal 
humanist approach.
166
  This view is rooted in the Lockean natural rights 
tradition, which deeply influenced the adoption of the Bill of Rights and 
the Fourteenth Amendment.
167
  At the same time, this view draws on our 
contemporary understandings of human personality, community, and 
rights.  
In Section A, I explore the phenomenology of free speech.  I argue that 
for communication to take place, the participants must recognize one 
another as persons, and that this is true in both the private and the public 
realms.  In Section B, I explore the concept of personality in greater depth, 
and show that it not only justifies the freedom of speech but also gives rise 
to other important rights which impose some limits on that freedom.  
Section C discusses how we should deal with substantial conflicts between 
free speech and other rights.  In Section D, I discuss the implications of 
this theory for the doctrine of content neutrality, which is central to the 
Supreme Court’s current jurisprudence.  Section E considers some 
objections to the liberal humanist approach, and especially the objection 
that the right to be free from dignitary and emotional injury is too 
subjective to support restrictions on speech.  Finally, Section F contrasts 
the liberal humanist approach with other theories of public discourse. 
                                                                                                                          
166 For a fuller exposition and defense of this theory, see STEVEN J. HEYMAN, FREE SPEECH AND 
HUMAN DIGNITY (2008) [hereinafter HEYMAN, FREE SPEECH]. 
167 See discussion infra Part V.A.2. 
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A.  The Phenomenology of Free Speech 
At the core of the liberal humanist theory is a conception of 
personality.  Persons are capable of forming and expressing their own 
thoughts and feelings and of directing their own actions.  This capacity for 
self-determination is the basis of human dignity and autonomy.  As a 
person, I demand recognition and respect from others.  But I can expect to 
receive this recognition and respect only if I am willing to accord the same 
treatment to others.  All human interaction depends on mutual recognition, 
which is a form of thought and expression that affirms the freedom and 
dignity of the individuals concerned and, at the same time, establishes a 
relationship of community between them.
168
   
1.  Private Speech 
In addition to being one of the most important forms of communication 
in its own right, mutual recognition is inherent in all other sorts of human 
communication.  To see this point, consider the most basic kind of 
communication: a conversation between two individuals.
169
  On one level, 
a conversation involves an exchange of information, attitudes, beliefs, 
requests, and so on.  On a deeper level, however, it involves a relationship 
between persons.
170
  This relationship is based on mutual recognition.  To 
communicate with another individual, I must recognize her as an 
intelligent being who is capable of understanding language or other forms 
of symbolic expression.  Likewise, if she is to regard the sounds or 
gestures that I make not as gibberish but as intelligible expression, she 
must regard me as an intelligent being who is capable of using language or 
other symbols to express meaning.   
In this way, every conversation involves a relationship in which the 
participants recognize one another as persons.  Of course, these 
relationships vary greatly, from the most significant and long-lasting to the 
most transient and inconsequential, such as two strangers conversing about 
the weather.  In the conversation, each person seeks not only to promote 
her own views and interests, but also to reach a common understanding 
and to promote an interest that she shares with her interlocutor.  Thus, as 
contemporary communications scholars have argued, conversations do not 
                                                                                                                          
168 The concept of recognition is most fully developed in the philosophy of G.W.F. Hegel.  See, 
e.g., 3 G.W.F. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF SUBJECTIVE SPIRIT §§ 430–39 (M.J. Petry ed. & trans., D. 
Reidel 1978) (1830, 1845).  For a comprehensive account of Hegel’s view, see ROBERT R. WILLIAMS, 
HEGEL’S ETHICS OF RECOGNITION (1997). Other important works on recognition include AXEL 
HONNETH, DISRESPECT (2007); AXEL HONNETH, THE STRUGGLE FOR RECOGNITION (Joel Anderson 
trans., 1995); and PAUL RICOEUR, THE COURSE OF RECOGNITION (David Pellauer trans., 2005).   
169 For a good overview of contemporary communications theory and research on conversations, 
see STEPHEN W. LITTLEJOHN & KAREN A. FOSS, THEORIES OF HUMAN COMMUNICATION ch. 6 (10th 
ed. 2011). 
170 See id. at 229–32, 245–49, 255–57. 
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simply involve the transmission of meanings from one individual to 
another, but instead involve shared work and a joint production of 
meaning.
171
   
To be clear, I do not wish to suggest that all conversations are—or 
should be—amicable in nature.  On the contrary, some involve strong 
disagreements or expressions of anger.  Even in those situations, however, 
an exchange of sounds and gestures can be regarded as an instance of 
communication only when the participants view one another as intelligent 
persons who are capable of understanding and expressing meaning.  In 
fact, when people argue with one another, they can be seen as appealing to 
standards that they share—or could come to share—as persons.  For 
example, if a woman accuses her husband of disregarding her feelings by 
flirting with another woman at a party, she is implicitly relying on a 
general notion about the respect that individuals owe one another, as well 
as on a more specific notion about the obligations that spouses have to 
each other. 
Yet some acts of speech are simply inconsistent with the duty to 
recognize the personality of others.  A dramatic example may be found in 
the 1982 Kansas case of Gomez v. Hug.
172
  In that case, it was alleged that 
a county commissioner named Hug had ordered Gomez, one of his 
subordinates, to walk over to him and had then shouted, “You are a 
fucking spic. . . . A fucking Mexican greaser like you, that is all you are.  
You are nothing but a fucking Mexican greaser, nothing but a pile of shit” 
—a torrent of epithets that he repeated over and over again.173  This act of 
expression reflected a deep contradiction.  On one hand, Hug clearly 
recognized that Gomez was a person who was capable of understanding 
the content of his tirade.  But on the other hand, the content itself was so 
degrading and humiliating that it was utterly incompatible with the respect 
that Hug owed Gomez as a person.  In a situation like this, it becomes clear 
that mutual recognition is not merely a descriptive concept, which points to 
a condition that is necessary for communication to occur at all, but also a 
normative principle, which establishes the ground rules for legitimate 
communication.  In this case, Hug’s speech violated those rules in the most 
flagrant manner.   
This discussion suggests two further points.  First, in legitimate 
communication, each participant recognizes the other as an intelligent 
being who is capable of using and understanding language.  It follows that, 
in principle, communication is dialogical, not monological: each 
participant must be free to express his own views and to respond to those 
                                                                                                                          
171 See id. at 54, 199–200, 205, 219–20. 
172 645 P.2d 916 (Kan. Ct. App. 1982).   
173 Id. at 918 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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expressed by the other.
174
  Thus, Hug violated the ground rules of 
communication not only by treating Gomez as subhuman, but also by using 
his own power as a supervisor to deny Gomez an opportunity to speak up 
for himself.  
Second, the duty to recognize others as persons entails a duty to 
respect the rights that flow from this status.  These rights include both 
positive rights to act in particular ways and negative rights to be free from 
particular forms of injury and abuse.  In the Kansas case, for example, the 
court held that Hug’s speech may have violated Gomez’s rights to equality 
in the workplace and to freedom from intentional infliction of emotional 
distress.
175
  When speech violates important rights of this sort, it not only 
contravenes the ground rules of communication, but also causes serious 
injury to individuals.   
2.  Public Speech 
In Snyder, the Supreme Court acknowledged that, under the First 
Amendment, the state sometimes may restrict private speech in order to 
protect individuals from dignitary or emotional injury.
176
  But the Court 
insisted that public discourse is essentially different and is largely immune 
from regulation on these grounds.
177
   
Of course, it is true that private and public discourse differ in important 
ways, including the nature of the audiences and the issues that they 
address.  On the most fundamental level, however, the two forms of speech 
should be regarded as similar, for public discourse also presupposes mutual 
recognition.   
The roots of this idea may be found in the natural rights tradition.  
According to John Locke, all human beings are naturally free and equal 
and belong to a single community.
178
  This “great and natural Community” 
is bound together by reason, which teaches that all individuals have a duty 
to recognize the humanity and inherent rights of others.
179
  In addition to 
life, liberty, and property, these rights include freedom of thought and 
belief.
180
  To secure these rights, individuals enter into a social contract— 
                                                                                                                          
174 Cf. Douglas Ehninger, Argument as Method: Its Nature, Its Limitations and Its Uses, 37 
SPEECH MONOGRAPHS 101, 102–03 (1970) (characterizing reasoned argument in this way).  
175 Gomez, 645 P.2d at 922.   
176 Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1215–16 (2011). 
177 See id. at 1219. 
178 See JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT bk. II, §§ 4, 128 (Peter Laslett ed., 
Cambridge Univ. Press 1970) (1690) [hereinafter LOCKE, GOVERNMENT]. 
179 Id. §§ 6, 128.   
180 See id. § 123; JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING bk. II, ch. 
XXVIII, at 353–54 (Peter H. Nidditch ed., Clarendon Press 1975) (1700) (discussing freedom of 
thought); JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION (William Popple trans., 2d ed. 1690), in 
A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION AND OTHER WRITINGS 1, 13 (Mark Goldie ed., Liberty Fund 
2010) (discussing freedom of belief). 
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an agreement that is necessarily premised on mutual recognition.
181
  
Through this contract, individuals form a particular political community 
with the power to make and enforce laws and adjudicate disputes.
182
  In 
this way, controversies over rights come to be determined not by the 
private judgment of individuals but by the public judgment of the 
community.
183
  Of course, this judgment can be formed only through 
public discussion.  
Initially, all political power is vested in the people as a whole.
184
  The 
people commonly delegate their power to a government, which is required 
to use that power to protect individual rights and to promote the public 
good.
185
  At the same time, the people always retain the right to determine 
whether the government is discharging its responsibilities in a faithful and 
effective manner.
186
   
The implications of this view for freedom of speech were developed by 
two radical Whig disciples of Locke: John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon.  
In a series of essays called Cato’s Letters, they argued that because rulers 
were merely “the trustees of the people,” the people were entitled to 
oversee their conduct to ensure that they did not abuse their trust.
187
  Thus, 
freedom of speech was not only an inalienable right of individuals but was 
also “inseparable from publick Liberty.”188  In this way, Trenchard and 
Gordon synthesized Lockean natural rights theory with the civic republican 
tradition, which stressed the need for public-spirited individuals to actively 
participate in political life to promote the public good.
189
  Like the works of 
Locke, Cato’s Letters was widely read in eighteenth-century America and 
had a deep influence on the new nation’s conception of free speech and 
republican liberty.
190
  
Thus, eighteenth-century Americans inherited a rich body of political 
thought which associated freedom of speech with the ideal of a free society 
that was based on mutual recognition and respect.  This ideal played an 
important role in the founding of the nation and the adoption of the Bill of 
Rights.
191
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A similar ideal may be found in the writings of Alexander Meiklejohn, 
which constitute one of the most influential modern defenses of political 
free speech.
192
  Drawing on the language of social contract theory, 
Meiklejohn maintains that Americans have entered into a “compact or 
agreement” to form a democratic society.193  This society is bound together 
by an “attitude of mutual regard” among individuals who see themselves as 
“a group of free and equal men” who are “cooperating in a common 
enterprise.”194  Under this “form of government,” Meiklejohn writes, 
“every citizen has, and has a right to have, dignity—the dignity of men 
who govern themselves.”195    
These ideas play a central role in Meiklejohn’s account of the First 
Amendment.  He develops this account by reference to “the traditional 
American town meeting,” in which members of the community gather to 
debate and decide matters of public concern.
196
  In this setting, citizens 
“meet as political equals.”197  Political discussion is an open and reciprocal 
exchange in which each person has “a right and a duty to think his own 
thoughts, to express them, and to listen to the arguments of others.”198  The 
principle of free speech means that citizens “may not be barred [from 
speaking] because their views are thought to be false or dangerous,” or 
because they take “one side of the issue rather than another.”199  At the 
same time, the very nature of the town meeting requires certain limits on 
expression: “If a speaker wanders from the point at issue, if he is abusive 
or in other ways threatens to defeat the purpose of the meeting, he may be 
and should be declared ‘out of order.’”200   
Like the interpersonal conversation which I discussed in the previous 
section, Meiklejohn’s town meeting offers a valuable paradigm for 
exploring the nature of communication.  In both cases, communication can 
be understood on two different levels: on one level, it involves an 
                                                                                                                          
genuinely dedicated to a special concept of how decisions should be made in a 
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exchange of information and ideas, while on another level, it involves a 
relationship between persons.  Of course, the nature of the relationship 
differs greatly in these two situations.  In its simplest form, a conversation 
involves a bilateral relationship between two persons.  By contrast, the 
political community that is assembled in the town meeting involves a more 
complex relationship, in which the individual relates to the community as a 
whole as well as to her fellow citizens.  But this complex relationship is 
also founded on mutual recognition and respect.  Speech that accords with 
these principles makes a contribution to what Meiklejohn calls “the 
thinking process of the community” by offering information and opinions 
that bear on the common good.
201
  By contrast, speech that is “abusive”202 
toward other members can be regarded as wrongful in several ways.  First, 
it can cause emotional and dignity injuries to the target(s) in a way that is 
comparable to the injuries that result from insults in a private 
conversation.
203  Second, it tends to degrade and humiliate the target(s) in 
the eyes of the community as a whole.  And finally, it injures the 
community itself by violating the ground rules for debate—rules that serve 
not only to protect the “dignity” of its members but also to protect the 
functioning of the meeting itself.
204
 
Although Meiklejohn’s image of the town meeting is an illuminating 
one, it obviously does not fully capture the nature of political discourse in a 
large, diverse modern society.  Unlike speech in the town meeting, that 
discourse does not take place within a single, unitary forum that is held at a 
specific time and place.  Nor does public discourse have a set agenda that 
determines what issues shall be discussed and for what period of time.  
Instead, it consists of many different forms of expression that occur in a 
wide variety of forums throughout the society and over the course of time, 
including individual conversations, social media, political rallies, candidate 
debates, newspapers, cable news talk shows, and the Internet, to mention 
only a few.
205
  
In this situation, many of Meiklejohn’s “rules of order” 206 are clearly 
irrelevant.  It would be absurd to restrict an individual’s speech at a 
political rally on the ground that she had “wander[ed] from the point at 
issue,” or that she had merely repeated what others had already said.207  
Likewise, many expressions that would be ruled out of order as “abusive” 
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in a town meeting
208
 or a legislative debate
209
 would barely raise an 
eyebrow if they appeared in the comments section of a political blog.   
In my view, however, none of this undermines Meiklejohn’s more 
basic claim that public discourse depends on an “attitude of mutual regard” 
among citizens.
210
  No matter how complex public discourse may be, at 
bottom it involves communication between persons.  As such, it 
necessarily presupposes mutual recognition.   
To elaborate this point, suppose that a hate group calls for the 
deportation or extermination of a small and vulnerable ethnic group within 
the society.  This speech might be addressed to members of the ethnic 
group itself or to other members of the society.  To the extent that it is 
directed to the former, the speech suffers from the same contradiction that 
we saw in connection with Gomez v. Hug:  in addressing the target group 
members, the speaker implicitly assumes that they are intelligent beings 
who are capable of understanding and using language—that is, that they 
are persons—yet at the same time, the speech denies that their status and 
rights as persons.
211
  In this way, the content of the speech directly 
conflicts with the formal conditions that make the speech comprehensible 
and legitimate.   
Suppose, however, that we regard the hate group’s speech as addressed 
not to the target group but to other members of the society.  In this 
situation, the contradiction that we noticed in connection with Gomez does 
not exist.  But another, equally serious one does:  while the speakers regard 
the audience members as intelligent persons, they deny the humanity of 
others (the target-group members) who have an equal claim to that status 
and who are also members of the society.  In this situation, the audience 
members cannot understand and accept the hate group’s speech without 
betraying their fellow citizens as well as their own humanity.  This too is a 
fatal contradiction which undermines the legitimacy of the speech.   
From a liberal humanist perspective, then, public discourse consists of 
discussion among individuals who recognize one another as persons and 
members of the community.  Once again, this does not mean that speech 
must always be polite or nonconfrontational.  In a free society, competing 
interests and ideological commitments will often lead to profound social 
and political conflict.  Public debate provides a forum in which such 
conflicts can be fought out.  But if it is to perform this function, and if such 
conflicts are not to degenerate into all-out warfare, there must be some 
                                                                                                                          
208 Id. at 25. 
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common ground on which citizens can stand to discuss their differences.  
At the deepest level, this common ground arises from mutual recognition.  
B.  The Justifications for Free Speech and Other Rights 
In the previous section, I argued that the concept of mutual recognition 
is central to all forms of human interaction, especially communication.  
Individuals can communicate only when they recognize one another as 
persons.  Because persons have rights, this duty of recognition extends to 
their rights as well.  Thus, the right to free speech carries with it a duty to 
respect the fundamental rights of others. 
What are these rights, and how can we identify them?  To answer these 
questions we must further explore the concepts of freedom and dignity that 
are inherent in personality.  In this section, I discuss what those concepts 
mean in the various areas of human life:  (1) the external world; (2) the 
internal domain of thought and feeling; (3) the social, political, and cultural 
sphere; and (4) the intellectual and spiritual realm.  These four areas 
correspond to the leading justifications for freedom of expression:  that it is 
an aspect of external freedom; that it is essential for individual self-
fulfillment; that it is necessary for democratic self-government; and that it 
is vital for the search for truth.  As I shall show, however, these same 
aspects of human freedom and dignity also give rise to other fundamental 
rights.  Speakers should have a duty to respect these rights, except in cases 
where the value of the speech outweighs the value of the other rights.  In 
this way, we can develop a rich and complex account that embraces both 
freedom of speech and other rights and that enables us to determine the 
appropriate boundaries between them.   
1.  External Freedom 
On the first and most basic level, individual freedom and dignity 
support a right to control one’s own mind and body, free from unjustified 
interference by others.  This is a right that the Anglo-American legal 
tradition calls personal security.
212
  This right provides a basis for the 
liberties protected by the First Amendment, for the ability to control your 
own mind and body includes the freedom to think as you like and to speak 
as you think.
213
  At the same time, personal security includes the right to be 
free from violence and the fear of violence.  Speech invades this right 
when it amounts to an assault, a threat, or an incitement to imminent 
violence.  These forms of speech also constitute a wrong against the 
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community as a whole, which has both a right and a duty to preserve the 
public peace and to protect its citizens against violence.
214
  This right of the 
community is also violated by “fighting words,” or those that tend to 
provoke an immediate breach of the peace.  
2.  Internal Freedom 
Personal security may be described as a form of external freedom—the 
freedom of a person as an embodied being who exists in the world.  In 
turn, external freedom is rooted in the capacity for internal autonomy or 
self-determination.  This is the second level on which we can understand 
the liberties protected by the First Amendment.  Internal autonomy 
includes the ability to determine one’s own thoughts, beliefs, and emotions 
without unwarranted interference or compulsion, as well as to express 
them outwardly through speech.  By protecting these forms of autonomy, 
the First Amendment seeks “to assure self-fulfillment for each 
individual”215 and to promote the values of “individual dignity and choice” 
upon which our constitutional order is based.
216
   
On this level, First Amendment liberties protect what Justice Louis D. 
Brandeis called the right to “an inviolate personality.”217  In addition to 
freedom of speech and thought, this concept embraces a number of other 
rights.  First, just as individuals have a right to bodily integrity, they also 
have a right to psychological integrity
218—a right that is violated by 
extreme and unwarranted attacks on their mental or emotional well-
being.
219
  Second, the right to an inviolate personality is infringed by 
speech or conduct that is profoundly insulting or degrading.  Third, it is 
violated by acts that invade one’s privacy, which serves to protect the 
boundary between the self and the outside world.  Finally, the right is 
violated by unjustified attacks on one’s reputation, which constitutes the 
social dimension of personality, or the self as it relates to others.  These 
rights to psychological integrity, personal dignity, privacy, and reputation 
may be just as important for individual self-fulfillment as is free speech 
itself.
220
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3.  Social, Political, and Cultural Freedom 
While the first two forms of liberty regard individuals as separate and 
independent, the third focuses on their relationships with one another.  
Individuals use speech to interact with family members, friends, co-
workers, and others in private life.  Individuals also have a right to free 
speech in the public or political realm.  Negatively, this includes a right to 
critically evaluate the conduct of the government, of public officials, and 
of others who play a prominent role in our common life.  And positively, 
political freedom of speech allows citizens to discuss public policy and 
other matters of common concern.  Individuals also use speech to 
contribute to the broader culture of the society.  
In protecting these forms of speech, the First Amendment affirms the 
freedom and dignity of individuals as social beings.  At the same time, the 
social nature of communication has important implications for our 
understanding of free speech.  When an individual speaks with others, she 
is engaging not in a purely individual, self-regarding activity, but in a form 
of interaction with others.  This is true not only in private conversations but 
also in the public realm, where citizens deliberate with one another on 
public issues.
221
  Thus the right to communicate is what may be called a 
relational right—a right to interact with others in a particular way or to 
take part in a common activity.  By their nature, relational rights must be 
exercised in a way that respects the personality and rights of those with 
whom one interacts.  On this view, the freedom to engage in public 
discourse does not give one a license to invade the rights of other people. 
4.  Intellectual and Spiritual Freedom 
For the liberal tradition, our freedom and dignity are ultimately 
grounded in our nature as intelligent beings.  This points to a fourth kind of 
liberty: the ability to engage in intellectual and spiritual activity in an effort 
to gain a deeper understanding of ourselves and the world we live in, as 
well as to express our sense of the meaning and value of existence.  To the 
extent that this is a purely individual activity, it should be protected so long 
as it does not violate other rights.  In many cases, however, intellectual or 
spiritual activity is conducted together with other people.  In those cases, it 
presupposes mutual recognition and respect in the same way as other forms 
of communication.   
5.  Free Speech and Equality  
The concept of equality is also central to the liberal tradition.  
Although individuals differ in many ways, they all have an equal claim to 
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freedom and dignity.  This is the positive meaning of equality.
222
  In 
negative terms, equality means the right to be free from unwarranted 
subordination and discrimination.
223
 
The concept of equality plays an important role in contemporary First 
Amendment jurisprudence.  Because all individuals have an equal right to 
free speech, the government is generally barred from favoring some 
speakers or ideas over others.
224
  At the same time, speech can be restricted 
when it amounts to a form of unlawful discrimination against others, as in 
Gomez v. Hug
225
 and other cases arising under federal and state laws that 
are designed to secure workplace equality.
226
   
C.  Conflicts of Rights 
In the previous section, I showed that the same principles that justify 
freedom of speech also give rise to other rights.  Speech that unjustifiably 
infringes these rights should not receive protection under the First 
Amendment.  In some cases, however, there is a substantial conflict 
between free speech and other rights.  In such cases, the law should 
determine which of the rights, under the circumstances, is most important 
from the standpoint of human freedom and dignity, the values that lie at the 
foundation of all rights.   
For an illustration of this point, we can look to the law of defamation.  
The common law afforded strong protection to reputation by imposing a 
kind of strict liability for false statements that damaged an individual’s 
standing in the community.
227
  In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
228
 the 
police commissioner of Montgomery, Alabama relied on this traditional 
doctrine to obtain a huge damages award against the Times for publishing a 
political advertisement that allegedly accused him of harassing civil rights 
activists in the South.
229
  The Supreme Court overturned the award on First 
Amendment grounds.  Writing for the majority, Justice Brennan declared 
that the right to criticize the official conduct of public officials is so vital to 
democratic self-government that it should prevail over the official’s right 
to reputation, except in cases where the statements at issue are knowingly 
or recklessly false.
230
  At the same time, the majority rejected the position 
that accusations against public officials are entitled to absolute protection 
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under the First Amendment—a position that was taken by Justices Hugo L. 
Black, William O. Douglas, and Arthur J. Goldberg.
231
  As Justice Brennan 
later explained, “[t]he use of calculated falsehood” could be restrained 
because it not only caused social harm but also was “at odds with the 
premises of democratic government.”232 
In subsequent cases, the Justices extended the New York Times rule to 
suits by political candidates,
233
 as well as to suits by “public figures” who 
play an influential role in the life of the community.
234
  However, in Gertz 
v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
235
 the Court concluded that applying the New York 
Times rule to private-figure plaintiffs would unduly sacrifice the right to 
reputation, a right that flows from “‘our basic concept of the essential 
dignity and worth of every human being.’”236  Under Gertz, states may 
allow private figures who are defamed on matters of public concern to 
recover for statements that are made without reasonable care.
237
  Finally, in 
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.,
238
 the Justices 
indicated that a lower level of First Amendment protection applies to cases 
in which a private figure is defamed on a matter of private concern.
239
  In 
this series of cases, the Court has sought to achieve a sensitive 
accommodation between the competing rights at stake. 
D.  The First Amendment and Content Neutrality 
In addition to illuminating the boundaries between free speech and 
other values, this discussion allows us to reassess the doctrine of content 
neutrality.  Writing for the Court in Police Department of Chicago v. 
Mosley,
240
 Justice Thurgood Marshall declared that “above all else, the 
First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict 
expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its 
content.”241  As Chief Justice Warren E. Burger pointed out in a brief 
concurrence, this was an obvious overstatement, for the Court has 
continued to hold that some categories of speech, such as defamation, 
fighting words, and obscenity, are not protected.
242
  Over the past four 
decades, however, the doctrine of content neutrality has come to dominate 
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First Amendment jurisprudence.  In Snyder and many other cases, the 
courts have resorted to this doctrine to grant First Amendment protection 
without making any serious inquiry into the value of the speech at issue or 
the harm that it causes to other values.
243
 
From a liberal humanist perspective, we can see not only the appeal of 
the content neutrality doctrine but also its limits.  Individuals are 
autonomous beings who must be free to determine the content of their own 
thought and expression.  As members of the political community, they also 
have a right to engage in collective self-determination.  The government 
violates the autonomy of individuals or the community when it 
unjustifiably interferes with the content of thought or expression.  As we 
have seen, however, the autonomy of individuals is limited by the rights of 
others.
244
  In a liberal constitutional order, the community also is bound to 
respect the rights of individuals.  When the government regulates speech in 
a way that is necessary to protect other rights, it does not violate the 
autonomy of individuals or the community; instead, it simply fulfills its 
fundamental duty to protect rights.  It follows that, in cases where free 
speech appears to conflict with other important rights, the courts should 
engage in a careful consideration of the values on both sides, and should 
not short-circuit this inquiry by invoking the content neutrality doctrine as 
has been done in cases like Snyder.
245
 
E.  A Response to Some Objections  
In this Part, I have argued that communication depends on mutual 
recognition, and that this is true not only in the private but also in the 
public sphere.  It follows that individuals who participate in public 
discourse have a duty to respect the personality and rights of others.  
Speech that infringes those rights is wrongful and subject to regulation by 
law, except in cases where the speech should be privileged because of its 
overriding value for First Amendment purposes. 
In point of fact, even contemporary First Amendment jurisprudence 
recognizes some limits on public discourse—limits that serve at least in 
part to protect the rights of other individuals and the community itself.  For 
example, the Supreme Court has held that even speech that relates to 
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matters of public concern may be restricted if it falls into the categories of 
threats, incitement, or fighting words.
246
 
In response, it might be said that these three doctrines protect only 
against violence, not against injuries to personality.  But that is not entirely 
true.  Consider the fighting words doctrine.  In the classic formulation of 
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,
247
 that doctrine holds that words are 
unprotected not only if they “tend to incite to an immediate breach of the 
peace,” but also if they “inflict injury” “by their very utterance.”248  
Although the Justices have sometimes overlooked the second branch of the 
definition,
249
 they have never overruled it.
250
  In any event, even if the 
doctrine were confined to the first branch, it would still function in an 
indirect way to deny First Amendment protection to insulting speech, since 
that is one of the kinds of speech that most commonly leads to a breach of 
the peace.   
Moreover, there is another doctrine that clearly serves to protect 
personality, and that is the law of defamation.  As discussed above, even 
when speech addresses matters of public concern, it is unprotected if it 
intentionally or recklessly defames a public official or figure or if it 
negligently defames a private figure.
251
  As the Court observed in Gertz, 
these limits on public discourse are necessary to protect the right to 
reputation, which is an essential aspect of individual “‘dignity and 
worth.’”252 
A critic of the liberal humanist view might respond that, to recover for 
defamation, a plaintiff must show more than simply an affront to his 
dignity: he must prove that the defendant made false statements of fact, 
and that she did so with the requisite state of mind.  In this way, the tort of 
defamation has a basis in objective fact.  By contrast, other claims of 
emotional or dignity injury are merely subjective and exist in the eye of the 
beholder.  Whether a person is upset or offended by the speech or conduct 
of others is largely within his own control.  Moreover, as the old adage 
about “sticks and stones” suggests, emotional and dignitary injuries are not 
real in the way that physical harm is.  For the same reasons, those injuries 
are incapable of objective proof.  In short, with the exception of 
                                                                                                                          
246 See, e.g., Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 363 (2003) (threats); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 
444, 447–49 (1969) (incitement); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–74 (1942) 
(fighting words). 
247 315 U.S. 568 (1942).  
248 Id. at 572.  
249 See, e.g., Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 518–19, 527–28 (1972). 
250 See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 381 (1992) (assuming for purposes of decision 
that the Chaplinsky definition remains good law).   
251 See supra text accompanying notes 227–37. 
252 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974) (quoting Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (Stewart, J., 
concurring)). 
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defamation, emotional and dignitary injuries are too arbitrary, subjective, 
insubstantial, and unverifiable to provide a principled basis for restricting 
the freedom of speech.   
However convincing this argument may seem in the abstract, it runs 
directly contrary to common sense and experience.  Consider Wilkinson v. 
Downton,
253
 the seminal case that led to the development of the tort of 
IIED.  In that case, a woman suffered intense emotional distress after a 
man falsely told her that her husband had been gravely injured in an 
accident.
254
  In a situation like this, it cannot plausibly be argued that the 
distress was within the woman’s own control, or that it did not constitute a 
real and substantial injury, or that a jury would have any serious difficulty 
determining whether it had occurred or not.   
This example suggests that we need to develop a conception of the 
person that is richer, deeper, and more consonant with experience than the 
one that figures in the Supreme Court’s current approach.  Although this is 
not the place to develop such a conception in depth, it is possible to sketch 
some of its main elements and to show how they justify legal protection 
against emotional and dignitary harm.   
As we have seen, human personality can be understood on several 
different levels.  To begin with, a person is an embodied being who exists 
in the external world.
255
  As a matter of instinct as well as reason, she has a 
deep concern with protecting her own life and bodily integrity.  When 
confronted with actual or threatened violence, she naturally experiences 
fear or apprehension.  At the same time, she may feel anger at being treated 
as an inferior being who can be abused and dominated by others.  These 
are emotional and dignitary injuries, but no one doubts that the law may 
and should protect individuals against them, even when they are caused by 
speech. 
On a second level, personality can be identified with the inner self.  A 
person has an internal life of thought, feeling, and experience.  He has the 
capacity to determine his own values and beliefs, to pursue them in his 
personal life, to express himself to others, and to form personal 
relationships.  Thus, just as a person is concerned with protecting his own 
bodily integrity, he is also concerned with protecting the integrity of his 
inner self, of his personal life, of his self-expression, and of his 
relationships with others.  Speech or conduct that violates this integrity 
naturally causes emotional and dignitary injury.  As the Wilkinson case 
                                                                                                                          
253 [1897] 2 Q.B. 57 (Eng.). 
254 Id. at 57.  
255 See supra text accompanying notes 212–16 (discussing external and internal freedom).  The 
law uses person in this sense when it describes crimes like homicide, assault, and rape as “offenses 
involving danger to the person.”  See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, MODEL PENAL CODE:  OFFICIAL 
DRAFT AND EXPLANATORY NOTES 117 (1985). 
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shows, there is nothing that is necessarily arbitrary, insubstantial, or 
unprovable about such injuries.
256
  On the contrary, when a person is told 
that someone that she deeply loves is gravely injured or dead, and when 
she believes the statement to be true, it would be highly abnormal not to 
experience intense grief and distress.  Just as the capacity to love is part of 
our conception of a person, so are the emotions that result from the loss of 
a loved one.  In this way, it is possible to give a reasoned account of 
emotional reactions such as fear and grief and to show that they have a 
solid basis in a conception of human personality.   
In response, it might be said that however true this may be of 
emotional reactions, it is not true of a sense of personal dignity, which is a 
purely subjective notion that depends on the particular values that are held 
by individuals or on the conventional standards that are accepted by a 
certain community.
257
  But this is not the case.  At the root of personal 
dignity is a sense of one’s inherent value as a human being, which is 
integral to the concept of personality.  Thus, it is normal and appropriate 
for individuals to have a sense of dignity and self-respect.  When they are 
subjected to speech or conduct that violates this sense—such as a barrage 
of racial insults and abuse—they suffer a real and substantial injury.258   
On a third level, a person is a member of the community and feels a 
sense of belonging and attachment to it.  Once again, speech or conduct 
that denies this aspect of personality—such as a cross-burning that is 
meant to drive a family out of the neighborhood—can cause serious injury.  
And the same is true of speech or conduct that attacks a person’s status as 
an intellectual and spiritual being—an injury that can be caused by 
religious persecution or other oppression based on thought, conscience, or 
belief.
259
 
In short, human personality has a number of dimensions.  A person’s 
identity resides in his embodied self, in his inner self, in his private life, in 
his social relationships, in his community membership, and in his 
intellectual and spiritual life.  When he suffers injury in any of these 
capacities, it constitutes a wrong to his personality.  In this way, we can 
give a rational explanation of the nature of emotional and dignitary harm. 
                                                                                                                          
256 See Wilkinson, [1897] 2 Q.B. at 57 (“The effect of the statement on the plaintiff was a violent 
shock to her nervous system, producing vomiting and other more serious and permanent physical 
consequences . . . .”). 
257 See ROBERT C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS 139 (1995) [hereinafter POST, 
CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS] (asserting that dignitary standards such as those used by the IIED tort 
“can have meaning only within the commonly accepted norms of a particular community”).   
258 See supra text accompanying notes 172–75 (discussing Gomez v. Hug). 
259 See, e.g., LAURI LEBO, THE DEVIL IN DOVER 213–14 (2008) (describing threats and hate mail 
directed against family who brought a lawsuit challenging teaching of “intelligent design” in public 
schools). 
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I have suggested that the Supreme Court’s current approach to the First 
Amendment is flawed because it lacks this sort of rich and complex 
account of human personality.  At times, however, the Court does appeal to 
such an account.  When the Justices discuss the values that underlie the 
constitutional protection of freedom of speech, they speak in terms of 
individual self-fulfillment,
260
 personal dignity,
261
 the political and cultural 
life of the community,
262
 and intellectual and spiritual liberty.
263
  Of course, 
these are the same values that I have discussed.
264
  From this point of view, 
then, the problem with the Court’s approach is not that it lacks a rich 
theory of personality, but that it applies that theory in a one-sided way by 
using it only to explain why free speech should be protected, while failing 
to recognize the ways in which the theory also supports other rights such as 
privacy, dignity, and emotional well-being—rights which also deserve 
protection under the law and which justify some limits on speech.   
F.  Other Theories of Public Discourse 
Finally, it may be useful to contrast the liberal humanist approach with 
two leading accounts of public discourse:  Robert C. Post’s theory of free 
speech and democracy and Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’s metaphor of 
the marketplace of ideas. 
1.  Robert C. Post’s Theory of Free Speech and Democracy 
The approach that Post takes is deeply informed by social theory.  Post 
maintains that constitutional principles like free speech apply differently in 
different areas of social life.
265
  In particular, he distinguishes between two 
domains that he calls community and democracy.  For Post, a community is 
“a social formation that inculcates norms into the very identities of its 
members.”266  These norms, or “civility rules,” prescribe the respect that 
individuals owe one another.
267
  Traditionally, the law has enforced these 
norms by regulating communication as well as conduct, for example 
through “such communicative torts as defamation, invasion of privacy, and 
intentional infliction of emotional distress.”268  “Through these torts,” Post 
explains, “the common law not only protects the integrity of the 
personality of individual community members, but also serves 
                                                                                                                          
260 See, e.g., Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972). 
261 See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971). 
262 See, e.g., Mosley, 408 U.S. at 95–96; New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 
(1964). 
263 See, e.g., W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).  
264 See supra Part V.B.  
265 See POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS, supra note 257, at 12. 
266 Id. at 300. 
267 Id.  
268 Id. 
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authoritatively to articulate a community’s norms and hence to define a 
community’s identity.”269   
The domain of democracy embodies a very different conception of 
individuals: instead of being formed by social norms, they are viewed as 
autonomous beings who are capable of “choos[ing] the forms of their 
communal life” through public discussion and democratic self-
governance.
270
  It follows that, while it is appropriate for the law to enforce 
civility rules in the ordinary life of the community, the enforcement of 
those rules must be “suspended” within the sphere of democracy in order 
to “open the space of public discourse” and thereby make individuals as 
free as possible to engage in “collective self-constitution.”271   
In this way, Post offers a highly sophisticated defense of contemporary 
First Amendment jurisprudence, which holds that the law generally may 
not regulate public discourse to protect individual dignity and personality.  
There are two difficulties with Post’s view, however.  First, it does not 
provide a fully adequate account of the preconditions of public discourse.  
As I have argued, in addition to the exchange of information, ideas, and so 
on, communication involves an underlying relationship between the 
participants—a relationship that is ultimately founded on mutual 
recognition.
272
  And this is true not only of personal conversations but also 
of democratic deliberation.
273
  People can engage in collective self-
determination only if they view themselves as a group with a shared 
identity, and this is possible only when they recognize one another as 
persons and members of the group.   
It follows that democratic deliberation depends on mutual recognition.  
Some statements that Post makes seem to reflect this idea.  For example, 
he follows Jean Piaget in holding that democracy is founded on “‘the 
mutual respect of autonomous wills.’”274  It is unclear, however, how this 
idea can be squared with Post’s position that the law’s protections for 
individual dignity and personality must be suspended within the realm of 
public discourse. 
                                                                                                                          
269 Id. 
270 Id.  
271 Id. at 120, 144, 149, 301, 330.  In his recently published Rosenthal Lectures, Post succinctly 
summarizes his position as follows: “Within public discourse, the First Amendment requires law to 
respect the autonomy of speakers rather than to protect the targets of speech; outside public discourse, 
the First Amendment permits the state to control the autonomy of speakers in order to protect the 
dignity of the targets of speech.”  ROBERT C. POST, DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE, AND ACADEMIC 
FREEDOM:  A FIRST AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE FOR THE MODERN STATE 24 (2012). 
272 See supra Part V.A.  
273 Id. 
274 POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS, supra note 257, at 187–88, 299 (quoting JEAN PIAGET, THE 
MORAL JUDGMENT OF THE CHILD 366 (Marjorie Gabain trans., 1932)). 
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The second problem with Post’s view is that it draws too sharp a 
distinction between the public and private aspects of personality.
275
  For 
Post, the democratic sphere is based on respect for individuals as 
autonomous beings who are capable of engaging in self-government, not 
on respect for individuals in their private capacities.  But the self cannot 
reasonably be divided up in this way.  The person who actively participates 
in the political realm is the same person who has a claim to respect for her 
bodily integrity, her personal dignity, her private life, her reputation, her 
personal and family relationships, and her intellectual and spiritual life.  It 
would hardly be logical for one to claim to respect another individual as a 
self-governing citizen but to deny her respect in every other way.  Thus, 
there is no good reason to hold that the First Amendment should protect 
public speech no matter how seriously it violates other rights such as 
privacy, reputation, dignity, and emotional well-being. 
Of course, this does not mean that the law should be allowed to restrict 
speech whenever it conflicts with or criticizes the particular beliefs, values, 
or sense of identity held by an individual or group.  For the liberal 
tradition, individuals have no right to be shielded from ideas with which 
they disagree.  Instead, they should be open to the views of other people 
and willing to critically examine and reassess their own beliefs.
276
  But it 
does not follow that speakers should have carte blanche to invade the 
personality rights of others.  As we have seen, those rights are not merely 
arbitrary or conventional; instead, at their core, they reflect our conception 
of the dignity that inheres in every person.  
It is also true, as Post argues, that the particular legal rights that 
individuals have are determined through democratic debate and self-
governance.  Thus, citizens must be free to argue that the laws that define 
individual rights should be reformed.
277
  However, it is one thing to argue 
for a change in (say) the law of privacy, and another thing to engage in 
speech that violates the rights of a particular individual as recognized by 
existing law.  Our commitment to democratic self-governance does not 
require us to grant blanket protection to speech of that sort.
278
 
                                                                                                                          
275 In this respect, his position resembles that of Meiklejohn, who insists that every person has two 
“radically different” capacities—his capacity as a citizen who has “a part to play in the governing of the 
nation,” and his capacity “as an individual or as a member of some private group,” who “is rightly 
pursuing his own advantage.”  MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 192, at 80. 
276 See generally JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (Currin V. Shields ed., 1956) (1859) 
(discussing the liberty of thought and discussion).   
277 POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS, supra note 257, at 120, 151. 
278 At first glance, Post’s theory clearly seems to support the result in Snyder.  The issue is more 
complex than it appears, however.  While Post holds that the legal enforcement of civility rules must be 
suspended in public discourse, he also observes that there are situations in which our commitment to 
democratic deliberation may be superseded by “other competing commitments, such as those entailed 
in the dignity of the socially situated self, in the importance of group identity, or in the necessary 
exercise of community authority.”  POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS, supra note 257, at 174 (citations 
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2.  Justice Holmes and the Marketplace of Ideas 
In this Part, I have argued that personality should play a central role in 
First Amendment jurisprudence.  While Post unduly narrows that role, 
Justice Holmes sought to do away with it altogether.  In his writings both 
on and off the bench, Justice Holmes rejected the ideas of natural rights 
and human dignity which had provided the traditional American 
justification for freedom of speech.
279
  Initially, he took the view that free 
speech should receive no more protection from legislative majorities than 
any other form of liberty.
280
  As he struggled to decide a series of cases 
arising from political persecution during the First World War, he came to 
change his mind, but he made no effort to return to the traditional rationale.  
Instead, in his powerful dissent in Abrams v. United States,
281
 Justice 
Holmes argued that while “persecution” is a “perfectly logical” way for 
people to pursue their goals, “the ultimate good” that they desire “is better 
reached by free trade in ideas—that the best test of truth is the power of the 
thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that 
truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried 
out.”282   
                                                                                                                          
omitted).  In such cases, the courts must determine where the boundary should be drawn between the 
domain of public discourse and the domain of community.  Id. at 174–77.  Post also recognizes that, 
paradoxically, “our conception of rational reflection and deliberation itself depends upon the 
observance of civility rules.”  Id. at 146.  Speech that violates these rules “is likely to be experienced as 
violent and coercive” as well as “irrational or valueless.”  Id. at 146.  Thus, in extreme cases, the law 
may need to enforce civility rules for the sake of public discourse itself.  Id. at 301.  
In these ways, Post’s theory is rich and complex enough to allow for differing positions on the 
issue of funeral picketing.  Although one can argue that this is a classic situation in which the legal 
protections for personality must be suspended to promote democratic deliberation, one can also argue 
that funeral picketing goes beyond the appropriate bounds of public discourse and thus may be 
regulated to protect the community’s norms of privacy, dignity, and civility.   
However, while Post’s theory does not foreclose arguments of the latter kind, it regards them as 
problematic because they seek to restrict public discourse on the basis of the values held by particular 
communities.  Id. at 177.  For this reason, Post seems to recognize a presumption against allowing 
“ideological regulation” in such cases.  Id.  Courts that follow this view are likely to reject particular 
limits on expression, as the Supreme Court did in Snyder.  See Robert Post, Participatory Democracy 
and Free Speech, 97 VA. L. REV. 477, 484 (2011) (observing that the holding in Snyder is “explicitly 
base[d]” on the notion that the protesters’ speech “should . . . be regarded as part of the formation of 
democratic public opinion”).  It follows that Post’s theory is subject to the same objections discussed in 
Part IV.B: it tends to unduly sacrifice the values of individual dignity and personality as well as to 
undermine the conditions for legitimate public debate.  For a fuller critique of Post’s view, see 
HEYMAN, FREE SPEECH, supra note 166, at 174–77, 276 n.56. 
279 Steven J. Heyman, The Dark Side of the Force: The Legacy of Justice Holmes for First 
Amendment Jurisprudence, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 661, 674 (2011) [hereinafter Heyman, Dark 
Side]. 
280 See id. at 675–79. 
281 250 U.S. 616 (1919).  
282 Id. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
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This passage suggests that the protection of free speech will promote 
the common good.  As Justice Holmes’s other writings make clear, 
however, he did not believe that there is such a thing as the common good.  
Instead, he held that the community is made up of different groups (such as 
employers and workers), each of which has its own interests and beliefs.
283
  
Social life is a Darwinian “struggle for life” in which each group seeks to 
promote its own good at the expense of other groups.
284
  In this way, 
human life is governed by force in the same way as all other phenomena.
285
 
Against this background, Justice Holmes’s defense of free speech 
appears in a rather different light.  What he calls “the power of the thought 
to get itself accepted in the competition of the market”286 is a function not 
only of the intrinsic merit of an idea, but also, and above all, of its capacity 
to embody the views of the most powerful group within the society.
287
  As 
he put the point in Gitlow v. New York,
288
 the function or “meaning of free 
speech” is to determine which beliefs are destined “in the long run . . . to 
be accepted by the dominant forces of the community.”289   
Thus, Justice Holmes understood freedom of speech in terms of power.  
Speech is one of the most important ways in which groups seek to attain a 
dominant position within the society, a position that allows them to 
promote their own interests and beliefs and to impose them on other 
groups.  Of course, this understanding of free speech is far removed from 
notions of respect for the personality and rights of others.  In addition to 
rejecting the idea of human dignity, Justice Holmes held that the interests 
of individuals may and should be sacrificed whenever necessary to 
promote the larger interests of the society—in this case, the interests that 
are served by the marketplace of ideas.
290
  
A strong echo of this Holmesian view can be heard in the Snyder case.  
At the end of his opinion, Chief Justice Roberts writes: 
Speech is powerful.  It can stir people to action, move them 
to tears of both joy and sorrow, and—as it did here—inflict 
great pain.  On the facts before us, we cannot react to that 
pain by punishing the speaker.  As a Nation we have chosen 
                                                                                                                          
283 See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, The Gas-Stokers’ Strike, in 1 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF 
JUSTICE HOLMES 323, 324–25 (Sheldon M. Novick ed., 1995) (arguing that an “identity of interest 
between the different parts of a community” does not exist). 
284 Id. at 325.  
285 See Heyman, Dark Side, supra note 279, at 692.  
286 Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
287 See Heyman, Dark Side, supra note 279, at 690–95. 
288 268 U.S. 652 (1925).  
289 Id. at 673 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
290 See Heyman, Dark Side, supra note 279, at 674, 706–08. 
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a different course—to protect even hurtful speech on public 
issues to ensure that we do not stifle public debate.
291
 
In this way, Chief Justice Roberts, like Justice Holmes, understands 
speech in terms of “power[].”292  A serious problem with this approach is 
that it allows people to use speech to abuse and dominate others.  
Arguably, that is what Westboro does when it pickets funerals.  At bottom, 
funeral picketing is a form of bullying directed against the grieving 
families.
293
  In the next Part, I consider whether this behavior should 
receive protection under the First Amendment.  
VI.  APPLYING THE LIBERAL HUMANIST APPROACH TO FUNERAL 
PICKETING IN ITS PARADIGMATIC FORM 
How would the liberal humanist approach apply to Westboro’s funeral 
picketing?  The best way to address this question is to begin with a 
paradigmatic case of funeral picketing, that is, a case in which the 
protesters are able to stand close enough to communicate directly with the 
family and mourners.  A striking example may be found in the funeral of 
Army Spc. Edward Myers, who was killed in Iraq and buried after a 
service held at Grace Evangelical Church in St. Joseph, Missouri, in 
August 2005.
294
  Westboro’s members stood along the highway directly 
across from the church, holding bright neon-colored signs bearing many of 
the same slogans as in Snyder.
295
  As the soldier’s mother, Charlotte 
Myers-Dicks, recently recalled, “The combat vets . . . were on one side of 
the road . . . , the Westboro Baptist Church was on the other side of the 
road, and we drove right in between them.”296  She continued:  “I’ve heard 
every word they said at my son’s funeral.  I read every sign.  They were 
specifically targeting my son.  Those are memories you just don’t 
forget.”297 
In this Part, I argue that when funeral picketing has this kind of direct 
impact on the family and mourners, it violates their rights to emotional 
well-being, dignity, privacy, and religious liberty, as well as the 
community’s right to protect the dignity of human life and death.  To this 
end, I first explore the nature of the grief caused by the death itself, as well 
                                                                                                                          
291 Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1220 (2011). 
292 Id. 
293 See Sacks, supra note 16, at 200–03. 
294 Phelps’ Group Protests at Soldier’s Funeral, KMBC.COM (Aug. 5, 2005, 6:54 AM), 
http://www.kmbc.com/Phelps-Group-Protests-At-Soldier-s-Funeral/-/11664900/12246900/-/50vy75z/-
/index.html.  
295 Grieving Mom Saddened by Westboro Ruling, KMBC.COM (Mar. 2, 2011), http://news.yahoo.
com/video/politics-15749652/grieving-mom-saddened-by-westboro-ruling-24391485.html (video).  
296 Id. at 0:53–1:01. 
297 Id. at 1:09–18. 
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as how the funeral and other forms of consolation respond to this grief.  I 
then address the ways in which Westboro’s funeral picketing increases this 
grief and interferes with the process of mourning.  Finally, I consider 
whether the picketing nevertheless should be protected because of its value 
as political or religious expression.  After discussing the paradigmatic case 
of funeral picketing in this Part, we shall be in a position to consider the 
particular facts of Snyder in Part VII. 
A.  The Grief Caused by the Death Itself 
As Chief Justice Roberts observed in Snyder, the legal term “emotional 
distress” does not fully capture what family members suffer in a situation 
like this.
298
  We need to unpack this term to have a sense of the grief 
caused by the death itself and of the ways in which it can be exacerbated 
by the Westboro picketing.   
Of course, the response that one has to the death of a loved one is 
deeply personal and to some extent unique.  Nevertheless, we can identify 
some of the most basic reactions that are commonly experienced by the 
mourners or survivors—terms that I shall use to refer to the parents, 
children, spouse or partner, and other close relatives and friends of the 
deceased.   
Perhaps the most basic response mourners have is grief for the 
deceased herself—for the pain or fear that she may have suffered, for the 
fact that she has lost her life, and for all the things that she will never be 
able to do in the future.  Of course, these reactions will be especially strong 
if the deceased was relatively young and was cut down before her time.  
The manner of her death may also cause grief and shock to those she has 
left behind, particularly if it was sudden or unexpected or involved 
violence.  When parents lose a child, they may also experience a sense of 
guilt that they have failed to protect her. 
In addition to the sorrow they feel for the deceased, the mourners feel 
sorrow for themselves.  The relationship that you have with a parent or a 
child, a spouse or a partner or a close friend, becomes part of your own 
identity.  When that person dies, you lose a part of yourself as well.  At the 
same time, you are forced to confront the reality of death and of your own 
mortality. 
In these ways, the loss of a loved one may have an existential impact 
on those who are left behind.  The experience may undermine their sense 
of the meaning and value of life.  As an Iraq war widow named Kelly 
Franz put it, when she learned that her husband Lucas had died “all the 
                                                                                                                          
298 Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1217–18 (2011). 
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color drained out of the world.”299  The death can also challenge the 
survivors’ religious faith and their sense that there is a loving God who 
cares about them. 
Funerals and other forms of mourning are intended to respond to these 
various and ramified sorts of grief.  These rituals are meant to remember 
the deceased, to express love and respect for him, and to recognize the 
significance of his life.  They are also meant to console the mourners by 
showing affection, support, and solidarity.  At the same time, these rituals 
reaffirm the meaning and value of life in the face of death.
300
   
B.  The Impact of Westboro’s Funeral Picketing 
1.  Freedom from Severe Emotional Distress  
Should Westboro’s funeral picketing, in its paradigmatic form, be 
protected under a liberal humanist approach to the First Amendment?  At 
the outset, it is critical to recognize that Westboro specifically intends its 
conduct to increase the mourners’ grief and to counteract the consolation 
that they receive from the funeral.  In its picketing, Westboro celebrates the 
death and, in the case of soldiers and murder victims, the violence that 
brought it about.
301
  In addition, while the mourners seek to affirm the 
value of their loved one and his life, the protesters repudiate that value.  
Instead, they declare that God has killed him and condemned him to hell in 
order to punish him, his family, or the community for their sinfulness.
302
  
In the funeral and other expressions of support, members of the community 
show their love and concern for the family; by contrast, the protest often 
seeks to hold the deceased and his family up to the contempt of the 
community.
303
  The funeral asserts the value of life in the midst of death; 
the protesters proclaim that all human beings deserve to suffer death and 
damnation—and that, apart from a tiny remnant of the elect, they all 
will.
304
 
                                                                                                                          
299 FALL FROM GRACE (Docurama Films 2007).  A powerful lament on the death of a friend by the 
poet W.H. Auden ends: 
The stars are not wanted now: put out every one; 
Pack up the moon and dismantle the sun; 
Pour away the ocean and sweep up the wood. 
For nothing now can ever come to any good. 
W.H. AUDEN, Funeral Blues, in ANOTHER TIME:  POEMS BY W.H. AUDEN 78 (1940). 
300 For a good discussion of mourning rituals and the ways that Westboro’s picketing interferes 
with them, see Mathis Rutledge, supra note 16, at 304–11.   
301 See supra text accompanying notes 91–95. 
302 See supra text accompanying notes 91–112. 
303 See supra text accompanying notes 93–94. 
304 See supra text accompanying note 75. 
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As we have seen, these messages are not merely intended for the 
public at large.  Instead, when Westboro pickets a funeral, one of its 
primary goals is to communicate these messages to the mourners 
themselves, and, in the paradigmatic case, the protesters stand close 
enough to do so.  It seems clear that speech of this kind, when directed 
toward people who have just lost a loved one, is capable of causing severe 
emotional distress.
305
  Moreover, that is exactly what Westboro intends to 
do.  As Rebekah Phelps-Davis explained at the Snyder trial, Westboro’s 
signs contain “hard-hitting language” that is “designed to strike the heart of 
anyone who reads it.”306  As the jury found, this conduct easily meets the 
requirements for IIED.  In the terms I have used, the picketing violates the 
mourners’ right to psychological integrity, or the right to be free from 
severe and unwarranted invasions of their emotional well-being.
307
   
2.  Privacy 
When people go to a funeral, especially when they were close to the 
deceased, they are intensely focused on remembering and expressing their 
love for her.  When Westboro appears at the funeral and, in the 
paradigmatic case, forces the mourners to view signs that condemn the 
deceased and celebrate her death, they are bound to experience this 
conduct as a gross intrusion into their personal lives.  In this way, the 
conduct infringes their right to privacy.   
In response, it may be said that individuals can protect themselves 
from unwanted expression simply by “‘averting [their] eyes.’”308  However 
true this may be in other situations, Westboro seeks to confront others in a 
way that is impossible to ignore.  As Timothy Phelps has explained, 
“Nobody looks at our signs or hears our words without immediately having 
to take a position—immediately.”309 
It may also be said that a funeral is not a purely private affair.
310
  The 
time and place of the event may be published in the newspaper; many 
people may attend; there may be a procession through the streets of the 
community; and, when the death has resulted from a war or some other 
well-known catastrophe, there may even be a degree of media coverage.   
                                                                                                                          
305 For a moving account of the impact that family members suffer when they are confronted by 
the Westboro protesters standing nearby, see FALL FROM GRACE, supra note 299, at 1:00:16 (interview 
with Kelly Franz).  
306 Record, supra note 59, at 1951 (opening statement of Rebekah Phelps-Davis).  
307 See supra text accompanying notes 218–19.   
308 Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1220 (2011) (quoting Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 
205, 211 (1975)) (internal quotation marks omitted).   
309 FALL FROM GRACE, supra note 299, at 17:25 (remarks of Timothy Phelps). 
310 See, e.g., Brief for Respondents at 2–6, 37–38, Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011) (No. 
09-751) [hereinafter Westboro Brief]. 
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I grant that many funerals have a public dimension, and that this is true 
of most of the funerals that Westboro chooses to picket.  But I would make 
three points in response.  First, the terms private and public do not refer to 
clear and distinct categories but rather are situated on a continuum.  While 
the funeral of a major public figure may be a highly public event, the 
funeral of an ordinary person lies much closer to the private end of the 
spectrum.   
Second, the concept of privacy is a qualitative one, which is used to 
mark the boundary around an area of life that is reserved to a particular 
person or group of people.  An outsider who unjustifiably intrudes into this 
realm may be said to invade the privacy of the people within, regardless of 
whether they are a small group such as a family or a larger one such as a 
political organization.  For example, in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. 
Patterson,
311
 the Supreme Court held that the State of Alabama had no 
power to compel a civil rights organization to turn over its membership 
lists because that would violate a right to associational privacy.
312
  
Although the internal life of the group may be public for its members, 
outsiders infringe the group’s privacy when they intrude into that life.   
The third and most important point has to do with how one conceives 
of funerals.  It may be that there are societies in which an individual is 
regarded as having value not so much for her own sake as for her role in 
the community.  In such societies, the funeral may focus on the community 
itself and the contributions that the deceased made to it.  But that is not the 
way that funerals are ordinarily understood in our society.  With the 
possible exception of those held for major public figures, the focus of a 
funeral is on the life and the value of the deceased herself.  In this sense, 
the funeral is a deeply personal event.  At the center of that event is the 
person who has died, then her family and close friends, and then other 
friends and members of the community.  Thus, even when many members 
of the community attend the funeral of a private person, it would be a 
mistake to view it as essentially a public event that should be treated in the 
same manner as, say, a political rally.  At the heart of the event is the 
expression of love and respect for the deceased.  When someone who has 
no personal connection with or concern for the deceased approaches the 
funeral and seeks to inject a broader religious or political message into it—
and still more when the message is one that condemns the mourners and 
the deceased herself—this constitutes a blatant intrusion into the mourners’ 
personal lives and thus invades their right to privacy.
313
 
                                                                                                                          
311 357 U.S. 449 (1958). 
312 Id. at 462.  
313 At times, Westboro has engaged in expression that is even more profoundly intrusive and 
hurtful.  For example, in March 1993, two days after a young musician named Kevin Oldham died of 
complications from AIDS, his parents received an envelope in the mail from the church.  Believing it to 
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3.  Personal Dignity 
Funeral picketing also has an impact on personal dignity.  Most 
clearly, this is the dignity of the deceased himself.  Some philosophers, 
such as Immanuel Kant, hold that the right to dignity is one that survives a 
person’s death,314 and some contemporary legal systems take the same 
view.
315
  Although American law does not do so, it does recognize a 
number of dignitary rights on the part of the family of the deceased.  In 
cases where his corpse has been mistreated, his family may be able to 
recover for the torts of intentional or negligent infliction of emotional 
distress.
316
  In other situations, the family may be able to assert a right to 
privacy.  For example, in National Archives and Records Administration v. 
Favish,
317
 the Supreme Court held that photographs of a suicide victim’s 
body were exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 
because that would “constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal 
privacy.”318  As Justice Anthony M. Kennedy wrote, “Family members 
have a personal stake in honoring and mourning their dead and objecting to 
unwarranted public exploitation that, by intruding upon their own grief, 
tends to degrade the rites and respect they seek to accord to the deceased 
person who was once their own.”319   
Justice Kennedy’s statement applies just as forcefully to Westboro’s 
funeral picketing in cases where protestors succeed in communicating 
directly with grieving family members.  This conduct violates the 
mourners’ right to protect the dignity of the deceased.  Moreover, because 
the community is founded on respect for human life, the picketing may 
also be regarded as a wrong against the community itself.  
4.  Religious or Spiritual Freedom 
In addition to being a deeply personal event, a funeral is often a deeply 
religious or spiritual one.  At the funeral, the mourners seek consolation for 
their loss and reaffirm their faith in the midst of tragedy and death.  
                                                                                                                          
be an expression of sympathy, they opened it and were shocked to find a flier denouncing their son as 
“a filthy dead sodomite.”  Grieving Family Forced to Deal with Phelps, THE TOPEKA CAPITOL-
JOURNAL (Aug. 3, 1994), http://cjonline.com/indepth/phelps/stories/080394_phelps06.shtml.  
314 See IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS *295 (Mary Gregor trans., Cambridge 
Univ. Press 1991) (1797). 
315 See, e.g., EDWARD J. EBERLE, DIGNITY AND LIBERTY: CONSTITUTIONAL VISIONS IN GERMANY 
AND THE UNITED STATES 98–99, 117–18& nn. 100, 102 (2002) (discussing German law, which 
protects a person’s reputation even after his death). 
316 See KEETON ET AL., supra note 227, at 63, 362; Alan Brownstein & Vikram David Amar, 
Death, Grief, and Freedom of Speech:  Does the First Amendment Permit Protection Against the 
Harassment and Commandeering of Funeral Mourners?, 2010 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 368, 377–
79 (discussing cases where emotional distress results from the mishandling of dead bodies). 
317 541 U.S. 157 (2004). 
318 Id. at 168; 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C) (2006). 
319 Favish, 541 U.S. at 168. 
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Westboro invades their right to religious or spiritual freedom when it 
attempts to seize their attention in order to deepen their grief and condemn 
their beliefs. 
C.  The Value of Funeral Picketing 
Thus, in its paradigmatic form, Westboro’s funeral picketing infringes 
the mourners’ rights by inflicting severe emotional and dignitary injury, 
invading their privacy, and interfering with their religious or spiritual 
freedom.  Yet this is only the first part of the analysis.  Under the liberal 
humanist approach, we must go on and ask whether, from a First 
Amendment perspective, the value of the speech is so great that it should 
be regarded as privileged despite the injury that it causes.
320
  In considering 
this question, we must remember that Westboro’s picketing is directed to 
two different audiences: the mourners themselves and the public at large.
321
  
Thus, we should ask: (1) whether the First Amendment gives Westboro a 
right to communicate its message to the mourners at a funeral; and (2) 
whether the amendment gives Westboro a right to communicate with the 
public by standing so close to a funeral that the group’s message is also 
effectively communicated to the mourners. 
1.  Should Westboro Have a First Amendment Right to Communicate 
with the Mourners? 
Although the liberal humanist approach holds that speakers generally 
must respect the rights of others, it recognizes that some First Amendment 
cases involve substantial conflicts between free speech and other rights.  In 
such cases, a court should determine which of the competing rights is more 
important under the circumstances.  To make this determination, the court 
should look to the values that provide the justification both for free speech 
and for other rights.  In other words, the court should ask which of the 
rights, under the circumstances, is most important for external freedom, for 
individual autonomy and self-realization, for participation in the social, 
political, and cultural life of the community, and for the pursuit of 
intellectual and spiritual truth.  The ultimate question is which of the 
competing rights has the greatest value from the standpoint of human 
freedom and dignity, the principles which lie at the basis of all rights.
322
 
At the same time, this balancing of rights comes with an important 
caveat: an asserted right can derive no value from its negation of another 
right.  For example, if making false and defamatory statements about a 
person is wrongful because it invades his right to reputation, the speaker 
                                                                                                                          
320 See supra Part V.C. 
321 See supra Part III.B. 
322 See supra text following note 226. 
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cannot contend that the speech should be privileged simply because she 
derives self-fulfillment from degrading the other person in this way.   
With this background, we are now in a position to determine whether 
the Westboro protesters should have a right to communicate their message 
to the mourners at a funeral.  The first task is to identify the nature and 
value of Westboro’s speech.  In Snyder, the majority suggested that this 
speech is basically political in nature.
323
  That is certainly not how 
Westboro’s members conceive of it, however.  Instead, they regard 
themselves as preaching a religious message of divine wrath.
324
  At the 
same time, of course, this message also bears on political issues such as the 
nation’s stance on homosexuality. 
As a general matter, people should have a right to proclaim their 
religious and political views to the world.  But the question we are 
considering here is whether outsiders have a right to proclaim those views 
to the mourners at a funeral.  The answer clearly is no.  The mourners are 
already engaged in the activity of remembering and grieving over a loved 
one, an activity that is deeply personal and spiritual.  In this situation, no 
one should have a right to intrude into their lives by forcing them to listen 
to someone else’s religious or political message.  And that is even more 
true when the message consists of a condemnation of the mourners 
themselves and the person whom they have lost.   
In response, Westboro would insist that its preaching is a “loving act,” 
and that it seeks to communicate with the mourners for their own good.
325
  
This assertion is difficult to credit.  After all, Westboro’s members believe 
that almost everyone they speak to has already been condemned to hell, 
and that is the message that they communicate.
326
  In any event, if the law 
is to respect the autonomy of the mourners, it must allow them to decide 
for themselves whether their well-being will be promoted by listening to 
Westboro’s message.  To be sure, granting the church members the right to 
picket would promote their own autonomy and self-fulfillment.
327
  But 
individuals have no right to pursue those values when they are defined in 
such a way as to deny the autonomy and self-fulfillment of others.  That is 
clearly the case in this situation. 
                                                                                                                          
323 See Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1217 (2011); supra text accompanying note 23. 
324 As Westboro wrote in 2005: 
[W]e’re the prophets of God.  We don’t care who’s in office; we don’t care about 
your politics; we don’t care about your policies on the war. . . . All of that is 
irrelevant to us.  The simple fact of the matter is . . . [that this war] is the means by 
which God is punishing America, and nothing is going to change that fact. 
Westboro, Message to Lawmakers, supra note 90, at 3. 
325 Barrett-Fox, supra note 70, at 231–33.  
326 See supra text accompanying notes 73–83. 
327 See Dan M. Kahan, The Supreme Court 2010 Term—Foreword: Neutral Principles, Motivated 
Cognition, and Some Problems for Constitutional Law, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1, 43 n.245 (2011). 
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2.  Should Westboro Have a First Amendment Right to Communicate 
with the Public in a Way That Also Directly Impacts the 
Mourners? 
For these reasons, we should not say that the First Amendment gives 
Westboro a right to communicate with the mourners at a funeral 
themselves.  But Westboro also preaches to the public at large.  Does that 
provide a good reason for holding that the picketing is protected by the 
First Amendment?   
Of course, if the picketing were directed solely to the public, there 
would be a much stronger case for constitutional protection.
328
  But the 
question under discussion is a different one: whether the picketers’ First 
Amendment right to communicate with the public should give them a right 
to stand so close to a funeral that they are also communicating directly 
with the mourners.  When the question is posed in this way, the answer is 
clear.  What draws so much public attention to this form of picketing is the 
fact that Westboro is confronting the mourners and telling them that they 
and their loved one are going to hell.  In this way, the publicity and 
attention that is generated by the picketing derives from the very thing that 
makes it wrongful in the first place—the emotional and dignity injury that 
it inflicts on the mourners.   
                                                                                                                          
328 Even in this situation, signs like “Thank God for Dead Soldiers” and “Thank God for IEDs” 
might be quite hurtful to the families of those killed in the wars.  However, if those messages were 
addressed only to the public—and if they did not attack specific individuals—the impact on the 
families would not seem serious enough to speak of a violation of their rights.  And even if one did, the 
effect on those rights would be outweighed by the value of the speech as a form of participation in 
public discussion. 
One could also argue that Westboro’s picketing should be held unprotected as a form of hate 
speech.  Elsewhere, I have argued that, under the liberal humanist approach, some forms of hate speech 
should be denied constitutional protection on the ground that they violate their targets’ rights to 
personality, citizenship, and equality, as well as the most fundamental right of all—the right to be 
recognized and treated as a human being and a member of the community.  See HEYMAN, FREE 
SPEECH, supra note 166, ch. 10.  Of course, a great deal of Westboro’s speech expresses a virulent form 
of hatred toward gay and lesbian people.  The group dehumanizes them by routinely equating them 
with animals.  See Barrett-Fox, supra note 70, at 235 n.685 (recounting rhetoric used by Westboro 
members against gay men and women such as “beasts” and “brutes”).  It displays signs that proclaim 
that “Fags are Worthy of Death,” and holds that they should suffer the death penalty. See FALL FROM 
GRACE, supra note 299, at 11:41; Westboro Baptist Church, All Nations Must Immediately Outlaw 
Sodomy (Homosexuality) & Impose the Death Penalty!, GODHATESFAGS (Dec. 3, 2002), 
http://www.godhatesfags.com/fliers/archive/20021203_outlaw-sodomy.pdf (last visited July 30, 2012).  
It is hardly surprising that organizations like the Southern Poverty Law Center classify Westboro as a 
hate group.  See Westboro Baptist Church, SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER, 
http://www.splcenter.org/get-informed/intelligence-files/groups/westboro-baptist-church (last visited 
July 30, 2012) (describing Westboro as “arguably the most obnoxious and rabid hate group in 
America”).    
I believe that, in some situations, it would be perfectly reasonable to hold Westboro’s expression 
unprotected as a form of hate speech.  In this Article, however, I shall not pursue the question of 
whether, and under what circumstances, hate speech should be excluded from First Amendment 
protection. 
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To put it another way, when rights conflict, the liberal humanist 
approach seeks to protect both of them as much as possible.  In this 
situation, that means that while Westboro should be allowed to 
communicate its message to the public, it should not be allowed to do so in 
a way that unnecessarily inflicts serious injury to the mourners, a group 
with whom Westboro should not have a constitutional right to 
communicate.   
D.  Conclusion 
In this Part, I have argued that the First Amendment should not protect 
the paradigmatic form of funeral picketing, in which the protesters stand so 
close to the funeral that they are able to communicate their message 
directly to the mourners as well as to the public in general.  In Snyder, the 
Justices did not discuss whether this form of picketing is entitled to 
constitutional protection.  Instead, they carefully avoided the issue and 
stressed that their decision was a “narrow” one “limited by the particular 
facts” of the case.329  It is reasonable to suppose that they did so because 
they recognized that this form of funeral picketing would present a very 
different case, and that it might not be entitled to constitutional protection.  
Yet the Court said very little to explain why this case would be different.  
By contrast, the liberal humanist approach offers a language and a 
framework that show why the First Amendment’s protection should not 
extend to this form of expression: it violates the mourners’ rights to 
emotional well-being, privacy, dignity, and religious liberty, and while the 
protesters do have a First Amendment right to communicate with the 
public in general, they can do so in a way that does not cause such serious 
injury to the mourners themselves. 
VII.  APPLYING THE LIBERAL HUMANIST APPROACH TO THE FACTS OF 
SNYDER 
A.  Was Westboro’s Picketing Entitled to First Amendment Protection? 
Now that we have considered the paradigmatic case of funeral 
picketing, let us return to the facts of Snyder v. Phelps itself.  Chief Justice 
Roberts stressed that “Westboro stayed well away from the memorial 
service”; that Albert Snyder could not read the signs as he was driven to 
the funeral; that the signs were predominantly directed to addressing public 
issues, not to attacking the Snyder family; and that “there is no indication 
that the picketing in any way interfered with the funeral service itself.”330   
                                                                                                                          
329 Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1220 (2011). 
330 Id. at 1216–17, 1220.  
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If one views the facts in this way, then Snyder is a fairly easy case for 
First Amendment protection even under the liberal humanist approach.  
However, if one also takes account of other facts disclosed by the record, 
this conclusion is more debatable.  In its news release, Westboro 
announced that it would “picket [the] funeral of Lance Cpl. Matthew A. 
Snyder . . . at St. John’s Catholic” church331—not, as the Court would have 
it, that Westboro merely planned to hold a demonstration that would 
“coincide with Matthew Snyder’s funeral.”332  The protesters were allowed 
to stand exactly where they had requested, at the main entrance to the 
church campus.
333
  Thus, as Justice Alito observed, the protesters 
“approached [the church] as closely as they could without trespassing.”334  
The funeral procession passed within 200 to 300 feet of the demonstrators, 
and Albert Snyder saw the tops of the picket signs, although he could not 
read what was written on them.
335
   
As Westboro’s members explained before, during, and after the 
protest, the signs they displayed—such as “America is Doomed,” “God 
Hates Fags,” “Fag Troops,” “Thank God for Dead Soldiers,” “God Hates 
You,” and “You’re Going to Hell”336—were intended to condemn not only 
the nation as a whole but also Matthew Snyder and his family in particular.  
Those signs were meant to assert that Matthew was a “fag” in the sense 
that he had voluntarily chosen “to fight for the United States of Sodom”;337 
that God had killed him to punish him and his parents for their “evil, 
wicked, and sinful manner of life”;338 that “[h]e died in shame, not honor, 
for a fag nation cursed by God”;339 and that he was “[n]ow in Hell.”340  
Albert Snyder could not read the signs at the time of funeral itself, but he 
did see them an hour or two later, during the wake, when someone turned 
on the television, and again the next morning, when the protest was 
splashed across the front page of newspaper.
341
  The jury found that 
Westboro’s picketing, together with its subsequent attack on the family on 
the Internet, invaded his privacy and caused him to suffer severe emotional 
distress—findings that Westboro did not dispute on appeal.342   
When all of the facts are taken into account, it becomes clear that, in 
contrast to the paradigmatic case of funeral picketing, Snyder is a very 
                                                                                                                          
331 Westboro, News Release, supra note 95. 
332 Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1220. 
333 See supra text accompanying notes 57–61. 
334 Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1222 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
335 Id. at 1213 (majority opinion). 
336 Id. at 1216–17. 
337 Epic, supra note 96, at 3791; see Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1216–17 (describing the signs). 
338 Epic, supra note 96, at 3791. 
339 Westboro, News Release, supra note 95.  
340 Id.  
341 See Record, supra note 59, at 2072, 2075, 2078, 2085, 2088 (testimony of Albert Snyder). 
342 See supra text accompanying notes 159–60. 
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difficult, borderline case.  On one hand, Westboro should have a First 
Amendment right to communicate its message on public issues to the 
community at large.  On the other hand, Westboro should not be permitted 
to communicate a hateful message to the family at this time, for that would 
violate the family’s own rights to privacy, dignity, emotional well-being, 
and religious liberty.  The question is where we should draw the line 
between these two sets of rights.      
When the issue is posed in this way, it is tempting to focus on whether 
Westboro was communicating with the family directly.  On this view, the 
protesters should not have a right to stand so close to the mourners that 
they are forced to see or hear the group’s message.  As long as the 
protesters stand further away, however, the First Amendment should 
protect Westboro’s right to communicate with the public.   
The difficulty with this position is that it disregards both the intent and 
the effect of Westboro’s picketing, as well as the realities of modern 
communication.  As Pastor Phelps testified, he and his followers believe 
that they have a duty to preach their message of God’s wrath “to every 
creature,” including the mourners at funerals.343  Presumably, Westboro’s 
members set up their picket at the main entrance to the church campus in 
hopes of being able to convey their message directly to the family.  They 
were unable to do so only because the clergy decided to reroute the 
procession through a different entrance and because the service was held at 
a sanctuary that happened to be on the opposite side of the campus.
344
  And 
even though Matthew’s father did not see or hear the message at the time, 
he did see and hear it within a matter of hours.
345
 
Thus, Westboro intended to convey its message to the family, and it 
succeeded in conveying that message.  Under these circumstances, it 
hardly seems decisive that the message was communicated not in a direct 
way but rather by means of coverage on television and in the newspaper—
media that, as Westboro surely knew, were substantially certain to bring 
the message home to the family.
346
   
                                                                                                                          
343 Record, supra note 59, at 2215, 2226 (testimony of Fred Phelps Sr.). 
344 See supra text accompanying notes 61–63. 
345 See supra text accompanying notes 120–25.  
346 In this connection, it is instructive to compare some other instances of unprotected speech.  For 
example, in Planned Parenthood v. Am. Coal. of Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1058, 1062–63 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(en banc), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 2637 (2003), members of a radical anti-abortion group held a news 
conference at which they unveiled “Wanted” posters that amounted to death threats against thirteen 
physicians who performed abortions.  The physicians were also featured on a threatening website 
maintained by the group.  The activists were convicted of making unlawful threats in violation of the 
Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C. § 248(a)(1), and their convictions were 
upheld by the court of appeals, which ruled that the speech was unprotected under the First Amendment 
“true threats” doctrine.  Id. at 1063.  As this case illustrates, threatening speech can cause serious injury 
and fall outside the First Amendment’s protection even when the speakers do not communicate directly 
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B.  The Vagueness of the Tort Doctrines Employed in Snyder 
For these reasons, I am inclined to disagree with the majority’s holding 
that the picketing in Snyder was entitled to substantive protection under the 
First Amendment.  On another critical issue, however, I believe the 
majority is on solid ground.   
To recover for the common law tort of IIED, Albert Snyder had to 
prove “that the defendant[s], intentionally or recklessly, engaged in 
extreme and outrageous conduct that caused [him] to suffer severe 
emotional distress.”347  If a state enacted a statute in those terms, it surely 
would be held invalid as applied to public-concern speech under the 
vagueness doctrine, which is meant to constrain the discretion of judges, 
juries, and prosecutors, as well as to ensure that those who are subject to 
the law have adequate notice about what it allows or forbids.
348
  The IIED 
tort presents a similar problem.
349
  As Chief Justice Roberts observed, 
“‘Outrageousness’ . . . is a highly malleable standard with ‘an inherent 
subjectiveness about it which would allow a jury to impose liability on the 
basis of the jurors’ tastes or views, or perhaps on the basis of their dislike 
of a particular expression.’”350  This concern is well-founded, and it is 
reinforced by one of the instructions that was given to the jury in Snyder.  
That instruction failed to make sufficiently clear that Westboro could not 
be held liable on the ground that its views were extreme and outrageous, 
but only on the ground that its conduct in interfering with the funeral 
was.
351
   
The invasion-of-privacy claim in Snyder suffered from a similar 
problem.  To recover, the plaintiff was required to show that the defendants 
had intentionally intruded on his private affairs or concerns in a way that 
                                                                                                                          
with their targets.  Of course, the same is true of defamatory and privacy-invading speech.  I believe 
that we should take the same position on the funeral picketing at issue in Snyder. 
347 Snyder v. Phelps, 533 F. Supp. 2d 567, 580 (D. Md. 2008) (citation omitted) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
348 See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:  PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 11.2.2, at 
970–72 (4th ed. 2011) (outlining the parameters of the “void-for-vagueness” doctrine). 
349 For some good discussions, see Brownstein & Amar, supra note 316, at 385–87; Eugene 
Volokh, Freedom of Speech and the Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Tort, CARDOZO L. 
REV. DE NOVO 300, 300–03 (2010).  But see Zipursky, supra note 16 (forcefully arguing that the tort 
should not be considered unconstitutionally vague in the context of funeral picketing).   
350 Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1219 (2011) (quoting Hustler Mag. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 
55 (1988)) (internal quotation marks omitted by Court).   
351 The full text of the instruction is reproduced in the Fourth Circuit’s opinion.  Snyder v. Phelps, 
580 F.3d 206, 214–15 (4th Cir. 2009).  A close reading of the instruction suggests that the district judge 
attempted to draw this distinction but that he did not do so in a way that was clear enough to ensure that 
the jury would understand.  The instruction also was defective because it asked the jury itself to 
determine whether the speech was entitled to constitutional protection—an issue that is generally 
regarded as one for the court.  This last point was one ground on which the appellate court relied in 
reversing the judgment the plaintiff had won at trial.  Id. at 221. 
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“‘would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.’”352  One can imagine 
funeral protests that would clearly meet this standard—for example, if 
Westboro’s members were to use amplification equipment to make 
themselves heard by those inside the church where a funeral was taking 
place.  In a case like that, no serious problem of vagueness would arise.  In 
Snyder itself, however, it was hardly clear that the impact on the family’s 
privacy should be considered “highly offensive” in view of the fact that the 
protesters believed they were exercising rights protected by the First 
Amendment.  Once again, therefore, the tort was unduly vague as applied 
to Westboro’s speech.  On these grounds, while I disagree with the broader 
reasoning in the Court’s opinion, I believe that it was correct to hold the 
damages judgment inconsistent with the First Amendment.  
VIII.  BUFFER-ZONE LAWS 
Although Westboro prevailed in Snyder, that victory may prove to be a 
Pyrrhic one.  Few, if any, other tort cases have been brought against 
Westboro for its picketing of funerals.  Instead, the most common legal 
response has been the adoption of laws that restrict picketing within a 
specified distance of a funeral.
353
  From a practical perspective, the most 
important question after Snyder is whether these buffer-zone laws are 
constitutional.  The federal courts of appeals have been divided on this 
issue.  In Phelps-Roper v. Strickland,
354
 the Sixth Circuit ruled that such 
laws may be justified by the need to protect the dignity of funerals and the 
privacy and emotional well-being of mourners.
355
  The Fourth Circuit 
expressed a similar view in Snyder itself.
356
  By contrast, in Phelps-Roper 
v. Nixon,
357
 the Eighth Circuit asserted that these interests cannot justify a 
restriction on the protesters’ freedom of expression.358 
In Snyder, Chief Justice Roberts observes that, although public-issue 
speech in a public forum is entitled to strong protection:  
Even protected speech is not equally permissible in all  
places and at all times.  Westboro’s choice of where and 
when to conduct its picketing is not beyond the  
                                                                                                                          
352 Snyder v. Phelps, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79020, at *30 (D. Md. Oct. 30, 2006)  (quoting 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 19, at § 652B). 
353 See infra text accompanying note 359. 
354 539 F.3d 356 (6th Cir. 2008). 
355 Id. at 362–66. 
356 Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206, 226 (4th Cir. 2009).  
357 545 F.3d 685 (8th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2865 (2009). 
358 Id. at 692.  In the wake of Snyder, the Eighth Circuit voted to reconsider the issue en banc in 
Phelps-Roper v. City of Manchester.  Ryan Koopmans, Eighth Circuit Grants Rehearing En Banc in 
Funeral Protest Case, ON BRIEF: IOWA’S APPELLATE BLOG (Dec. 13, 2011, 4:36 PM), 
http://iowaappeals.com/eighth-circuit-grants-rehearing-en-banc-in-funeral-protest-case.  
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Government’s regulatory reachit is subject to reasonable 
time, place, or manner restrictions that are consistent with the 
standards announced in this Court’s precedents.  Maryland 
now has a law imposing restrictions on funeral picketing, as 
do 43 other States and the Federal Government.  To the 
extent these laws are content neutral, they raise very different 
questions from the tort verdict at issue in this case.
359
  
Although Chief Justice Roberts makes clear that the Court is not 
passing on the constitutionality of these laws,
360
 this passage does suggest 
that the government has some power to protect mourners through the 
enactment of buffer-zone laws.  If that turns out to be true, then although 
Westboro won the battle over common-law tort liability in Snyder, it may 
lose the larger war over the regulation of funeral picketing.  
In this Part, I explore the use of time, place, and manner regulations in 
the funeral context.  I begin with the question of whether buffer-zone laws 
are in fact “consistent with the standards announced in [the Supreme] 
Court’s precedents.”361  Next, I discuss how broad a buffer zone may be.  
Finally, I consider the sanctions that may be imposed for violations. 
A.  The Constitutionality of Buffer-Zone Laws 
When Chief Justice Roberts referred to the standards set forth in earlier 
decisions, he cited the Court’s 1984 opinion in Clark v. Community for 
Creative Non-Violence.
362
  That case indicates that time, place, and manner 
regulations “are valid provided [1] that they are justified without reference 
to the content of the regulated speech, [2] that they are narrowly tailored to 
serve a significant governmental interest, and [3] that they leave open 
ample alternative channels for communication of the information.”363 
Buffer-zone laws regulate the times and places at which funeral 
picketing may occur.  A good example is the Ohio statute at issue in 
Phelps-Roper.
364
  That law bans picketing within 300 feet of a place where 
a funeral is being held, from one hour before to one hour after the 
funeral.
365
  For the purpose of discussion, I shall focus on this statute, 
                                                                                                                          
359 Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1218 (2011) (alteration in original) (citations omitted) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
360 Id. 
361 Id. 
362 Id. (citing Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)). 
363 Clark, 468 U.S. at 293. 
364 539 F.3d 356 (6th Cir. 2008). 
365 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3767.30 (West 2006).  The statute provided that:  
[N]o person shall picket or engage in other protest activities, nor shall any 
association or corporation cause picketing or other protest activities to occur, within 
three hundred feet of any residence, cemetery, funeral home, church, synagogue, or 
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which is typical of the laws that have been passed in a number of 
jurisdictions.
366
 
Although the courts have been divided over the constitutionality of 
such laws, they agree that the laws satisfy the first Clark requirement—that 
of content neutrality.  In determining whether a statute is content neutral, 
the courts look to both its text and its purpose.  The language of the Ohio 
statute makes no reference to the content of the protesters’ speech.  Instead, 
the statute applies to all demonstrations without regard to whether they 
support or oppose gay rights, or the Catholic Church, or the policies of the 
United States military.  There is no doubt, then, that the law is content 
neutral on its face.  As for purpose, the government can make a strong 
argument that it sought to regulate funeral picketing not “because of 
disagreement with the message” that it conveys,367 but because of the 
importance of protecting the mourners attending funerals.  
Of course, the great majority of funeral picketing laws have been 
passed in response to Westboro’s activities.368  On this ground, the group 
might argue that the laws violate the First Amendment doctrine that forbids 
discrimination on the basis of viewpoint.  As the Supreme Court has made 
clear, however, a statute should not be found to violate this doctrine 
“simply because its enactment was motivated by the conduct of the 
partisans on one side of a debate.”369  Instead, when a law aims to protect 
an important interest such as privacy, and when the law applies 
evenhandedly to all speech that seriously injures that interest, the law does 
not amount to forbidden viewpoint discrimination.
370
   
Westboro might also argue that buffer-zone laws are viewpoint-
discriminatory because they restrict its own speech but not the speech of 
those who desire to express more favorable messages toward the family.  
In Snyder, for example, the route of the procession leaving the church was 
lined by children from the Catholic school that Matthew had attended, as 
well as by police and firefighters who saluted the procession as it went 
                                                                                                                          
other establishment during or within one hour before or one hour after the 
conducting of an actual funeral or burial service at that place. 
Id.  The statute defined “other protest activities” to mean “any action that is disruptive or undertaken to 
disrupt or disturb a funeral or burial service.”  Id. 
366 The local ordinance that is now before the Eighth Circuit en banc in Phelps-Roper v. City of 
Manchester imposes similar restrictions.  See Koopmans, supra note 358.  
367 Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (“The principal inquiry in 
determining content neutrality . . . is whether the government has adopted a regulation of speech 
because of disagreement with the message it conveys.” (citing Clark, 468 U.S. at 295)). 
368 Interestingly, Ohio passed its first regulation of funeral picketing in 1957, long before 
Westboro began to protest at funerals.  See Strickland, 539 F.3d at 358.  In 2006, the legislature made 
several changes to the law, id., changes which no doubt were prompted by Westboro’s conduct. 
369 Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 724 (2000).  
370 See id. at 723–24 (upholding a law which sought to protect individuals from harassment when 
entering health care facilities). 
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by.
371
  Also present outside the funeral were motorcyclists from the Patriot 
Guard Riders, a veterans group that offers to attend to support the family 
and to shield them from the Westboro protesters.
372
   
Westboro might contend that the state cannot constitutionally 
discriminate between these demonstrations and the ones that the church 
engages in.  This contention would be convincing if the other groups were 
allowed to demonstrate in favor of certain ideological positions while 
Westboro was forbidden to express its own opposing views.  But that is not 
an accurate description of what takes place in a situation like Snyder.  
Instead, the school children, the public safety officers, and the Patriot 
Guard Riders essentially act as participants in the funeral procession itself.  
Thus, if a buffer-zone law were to permit their actions but not Westboro’s, 
the law would not be discriminating on the basis of viewpoint, but would 
simply be distinguishing between participants who were present to express 
their support for the family and to pay their last respects to the deceased, 
on one hand, and outsiders who sought to intrude into the observance to 
express a particular ideological message to the mourners and the public, on 
the other hand.   
Finally, Westboro might argue that buffer-zone laws are content-based 
because they seek to protect individuals against offensive speech.  Of 
course, it is a central tenet of contemporary First Amendment 
jurisprudence that the law may not restrict speech on this ground.
373
  But 
the Court has recognized an exception to this principle in situations where 
“the degree of captivity makes it impractical for the unwilling viewer or 
auditor to avoid exposure.”374  “The right to avoid unwelcome speech has 
special force in the privacy of the home and its immediate surroundings, 
but can also be protected in confrontational settings” such as protests 
outside a medical facility.
375
  In such situations, the Court has observed that 
“[i]t may not be the content of the speech, as much as the deliberate ‘verbal 
[or visual] assault,’ that justifies proscription.”376  
This use of the captive audience doctrine fits the problem of funeral 
picketing to a T.  As the Sixth Circuit has recognized, mourners are 
compelled to attend funerals not merely by the need for emotional support 
but also by “deep tradition and social obligation.”377  Once there, they 
cannot easily avoid exposure to disruptive picketing.  Nor can they protect 
                                                                                                                          
371 Record, supra note 59, at 2082 (testimony of Albert Snyder). 
372 Westboro Brief, supra note 310, at 6. 
373 See, e.g., Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 210 (1975) (“[T]he Constitution 
does not permit government to decide which types of otherwise protected speech are sufficiently 
offensive to require protection for the unwilling listener or viewer.”). 
374 Id. at 209.  
375 Hill, 530 U.S. at 717 (citations omitted).  
376 Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at 210 n.6. 
377 Phelps-Roper v. Strickland, 539 F.3d 356, 366 (6th Cir. 2008).  
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themselves by simply “avert[ing] their eyes” from the messages on the 
signs, for, in a situation like this, the “mere presence” of intrusive 
protesters “is sufficient to inflict the harm,”378 and Westboro does 
everything it can to make its protests impossible to ignore.
379
  For these 
reasons, I believe that funeral picketing is one of the rare situations in 
which the government should be allowed to protect individuals against 
unwelcome speech on the ground “that substantial privacy interests are 
being invaded in an essentially intolerable manner.”380 
Thus, buffer-zone laws should be found to satisfy the first element of 
the Court’s test for time, place, and manner regulations.  For the reasons 
discussed in Part V, the laws should also be found to advance “significant 
government interest[s]”381 by protecting the privacy, emotional well-being, 
and religious freedom of mourners, as well as the dignity and solemnity of 
funerals.  It also is difficult to deny that the laws “leave open ample 
alternative channels for communication of the information.”382  As Justice 
Alito explained in his Snyder dissent, the First Amendment ensures that 
Westboro’s members “have almost limitless opportunities to express their 
views”:    
They may write and distribute books, articles, and other 
texts; they may create and disseminate video and audio 
recordings; they may circulate petitions; they may speak to 
individuals and groups in public forums and in any private 
venue that wishes to accommodate them; they may picket 
peacefully in countless locations; they may appear on 
television and speak on the radio; they may post messages on 
the Internet and send out e-mails.
383
 
Moreover, a buffer-zone law would even allow them to picket as long as 
they did so outside the specified zone or time period.   
It follows that a buffer-zone law should be upheld under the Clark test 
if it is “narrowly tailored.”384  One of the key issues that arise under this 
heading is how large the zone can be.   
                                                                                                                          
378 Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
379 See supra text accompanying note 306. 
380 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971).  In Snyder, the majority found that this standard 
was not met on the facts of the case.  Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1220 (2011). But this 
conclusion rested in large part on the fact that Westboro had “stayed well away from the memorial 
service.”  Id.  Of course, this conclusion does not conflict with the view that the state may require 
protesters to “stay[] well away” in order to protect mourners from being forced to see or hear their 
message.  Id.   
381 Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984).   
382 Id.  
383 Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1222 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
384 Clark, 468 U.S. at 293. 
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B.  The Size of the Buffer Zone 
In Snyder, the Court offered two examples of situations in which it had 
approved restrictions on “the location of targeted picketing.”385  In Frisby 
v. Schultz,
386
 the Court “upheld a ban on such picketing ‘before or about’ a 
particular residence.”387  In Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, Inc.,388 the 
Court upheld a provision of an injunction that banned picketing within 
thirty-six feet of the property line of a clinic that performed abortions, but 
struck down another provision that banned picketing within 300 feet of the 
residence of an employee or owner of the clinic.
389
  Westboro would argue 
that a funeral picketing law should not be upheld if it establishes a buffer 
zone substantially larger than those upheld in Frisby and Madsen.   
This argument is unpersuasive, however.  As the Court indicated in 
Madsen, courts “must, of course, take account of the place to which the 
regulations apply in determining whether these restrictions burden more 
speech than necessary.”390  In other words, what constitutes an appropriate 
buffer zone depends on the particular context.
391
   
The critical issue here is whether Westboro has a right to communicate 
with the mourners at all.  As I argued in Part VI, the answer is no because 
this would inflict serious and unwarranted injury on them.  If this view is 
correct, then the First Amendment should allow the government to 
establish a buffer zone that is large enough to keep the protesters out of the 
sight and hearing of the mourners.   
This conclusion does not conflict with the Court’s opinion in Snyder.  
Chief Justice Roberts stressed that the demonstration in that case took 
place “some 1,000 feet from the church, out of sight of those at the 
church.”392  In this situation, he treated the speech as addressed to the 
public at large, rather than to those attending the funeral.
393
  Snyder holds 
that Westboro has a constitutional right to communicate with the public 
and to do so in a way that uses the funeral “to increase publicity for its 
views,” even if this causes emotional injury to the family.394  But the 
decision does not hold that Westboro has a First Amendment right to 
communicate directly with the mourners themselves.  Unless the Court is 
prepared to hold that there is such a right, it would seem perfectly 
reasonable for states to establish buffer zones that keep the protesters “well 
                                                                                                                          
385 Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1212. 
386 487 U.S. 474 (1988).  
387 Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1218 (quoting Frisby, 487 U.S. at 477).  
388 512 U.S. 753 (1994). 
389 Id. at 768–71, 774–75. 
390 Id. at 772. 
391 See Phelps-Roper v. Strickland, 539 F.3d 356, 368 (6th Cir. 2008).  
392 Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1218. 
393 See supra text accompanying note 69. 
394 Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1217–18. 
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away” from the funeral,395 while permitting them to stand close enough to 
use it as a backdrop for their expression.  On this view, state laws that 
establish buffer zones of several hundred feet should not be held to violate 
the First Amendment.    
The same reasoning supports the constitutionality of the central 
provisions of section 601 of the Honoring America’s Veterans Act 
(“HAVA”), which was passed by Congress in the summer of 2012.396  
Section 601(a) sets forth the constitutional authority for the 
ActCongress’s powers in relation to the militaryas well as the Act’s 
purpose: to promote the recruitment and retention of members of the 
Armed Forces “by protecting the dignity of [their] service” as well as “the 
privacy of their immediate family members and other attendees during 
funeral services for such members.”397  Section 601(b) adopts time, place, 
and manner regulations for funerals at cemeteries that are not controlled by 
the federal government.
398
  These regulations are codified at 18 U.S.C.  
§ 1388.
399
  Finally, section 601(c) imposes similar regulations (which are 
codified at 38 U.S.C. § 2413) with respect to Arlington National Cemetery 
and other sites that are under federal control.
400
 
For purposes of simplicity, I shall focus on 18 U.S.C. § 1388.  The 
statute sets forth three prohibitions.  First, subsection (a)(1) makes it 
unlawful, within 300 feet of a military funeral, to willfully make “any 
noise or diversion . . . that disturbs or tends to disturb the peace or good 
order of such funeral, . . . with the intent of disturbing the peace or good 
order of such funeral.”401  As I have explained, a provision like this should 
be upheld as a reasonable effort to protect the dignity of funerals and the 
privacy of mourners.
402
  Second, subsection (a)(2) makes it unlawful, 
within 500 feet of a funeral, to willfully impede access to or egress from 
the location where it is being held
403conduct that clearly is not protected 
                                                                                                                          
395 Id. at 1220.  
396 Honoring America’s Veterans and Caring for Camp Lejeune Families Act of 2012, P.L 112-
154, § 601, 126 Stat. 1165, slip law at 1, 31–35 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1388 and 38 U.S.C. § 2413).  
An explanation and constitutional defense of the Act may be found in S. REP. NO. 112–88, at 39–45 
(2011). 
397 § 601(a), slip law at 31. 
398 § 601(b), slip law at 32–33. 
399 Id.  
400 § 601(c), slip law at 34–35. 
401 18 U.S.C. § 1388(a)(1) (2012).  Congress’s first effort to regulate funeral protests at nonfederal 
cemeteries was the Respect for the Funerals of Fallen Heroes Act, Pub. L. 109-464, § 1, 120 Stat. 3480, 
3480-81 (2006) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1388 (prior to 2012 amendment)).  Under that law, the 
distance was 150 feet.  18 U.S.C. § 1388(a)(2) (prior to 2012 amendment).   
402 See supra text accompanying notes 390–95. 
403 18 U.S.C. § 1388(a)(2). Under the 2006 law, the distance was 300 feet.  See 18 U.S.C.  
§ 1388(a)(2) (prior to 2012 amendment). 
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by the First Amendment.
404
  Finally, subsection (a)(3) makes it unlawful to 
stand near the home of a family member of the deceased and to willfully 
create any noise or diversion that intentionally disturbs the peace of that 
person.
405
  This provision protects residential privacy in the same way that 
the Court approved in Frisby v. Schultz,
406
 and it does so in a situation 
where the privacy interest is far more compelling. 
Under the Act, these restrictions apply from two hours before to two 
hours after a funeral.
407
  Westboro might argue that this time period is too 
long and that it does not strike a reasonable balance between the competing 
interests of the protesters and the mourners.  It is not clear, however, that 
this provision falls outside the bounds of reasonable legislative judgment.  
Moreover, it is important to remember that subsection (a)(1) applies only 
to acts that intentionally disturb the peace or good order of the funeral.
408
  
There is no reason that such acts should receive constitutional protection 
simply because they take place more than, say, an hour before or after the 
funeral.  And this point is even clearer with respect to section (a)(2)’s 
prohibition on intentionally interfering with access or egress and section 
(a)(3)’s ban on intentionally disturbing the peace of mourners.  
Accordingly, these provisions should be upheld under the Court’s time, 
place, and manner doctrine.
409
 
                                                                                                                          
404 See, e.g., Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 718 (2000) (upholding a statute that was designed to 
protect “the right of ‘passage without obstruction’” when entering or leaving an abortion clinic); id. at 
747 (Scalia., J., dissenting) (recognizing that the state may proscribe conduct that “impede[s] . . . or 
block[s] access to a health care facility”); Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network, 519 U.S. 357, 380–82 
(1997) (upholding an injunction establishing a buffer zone as a reasonable way to prevent interference 
with access to or egress from an abortion clinic).  
405 18 U.S.C. § 1388(a)(3). 
406 487 U.S. 474 (1988); see also S. REP. NO. 112–88,  at 41 (2011) (relying on Frisby in support 
of this provision). 
407 18 U.S.C. § 1388(a). 
408 18 U.S.C. § 1388(a)(1)(B)(2). 
409 Some of the Act’s other provisions are more problematic.  For example, § 1388(e) provides: 
It shall be a rebuttable presumption that the violation was committed willfully for 
purposes of determining relief under this section if the violator, or a person acting in 
concert with the violator, did not have reasonable grounds to believe, either from the 
attention or publicity sought by the violator or other circumstance, that the conduct 
of such violator or person would not disturb or tend to disturb the peace or good 
order of such funeral, impede or tend to impede the access to or egress from such 
funeral, or disturb or tend to disturb the peace of any surviving member of the 
deceased person's immediate family who may be found on or near the residence, 
home, or domicile of the deceased person's immediate family on the date of the 
service or ceremony. 
18 U.S.C. § 1388(e).  38 U.S.C. § 2413(e) contains similar language.  These somewhat opaque 
provisions raise complex issues of statutory and constitutional interpretation which I shall not explore 
here.  See infra note 414 (discussing the Act’s provisions for “statutory damages”).   
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C.  Sanctions for Violation 
In Snyder, the Court overturned a judgment that required Westboro to 
pay tort damages for IIED and invasion of privacy.  It may seem, then, that 
while Snyder leaves the door open for the adoption of buffer-zone laws, it 
holds that funeral protesters cannot be subjected to damages liability.  For 
two reasons, however, the decision should not be read that broadly.  First, 
as Chief Justice Roberts made clear, the opinion “is limited by the 
particular facts” of the case.410  That does not mean the opinion contains no 
broader holdings.  As I read it, for example, it does indicate that the 
standards for IIED are inherently so subjective that they cannot 
constitutionally be applied to any instance of otherwise protected speech 
on matters of public concern, at least when the speech takes place within a 
public forum.
411
  However, the Court makes no broad pronouncements 
about the tort of intrusion upon seclusion.
412
  To return to an earlier 
hypothetical, if Westboro were to use amplification equipment to be heard 
within the church itself, it seems unlikely that the Court would hold that 
the First Amendment precluded the award of damages for invasion of 
privacy. 
Second, and more importantly, Snyder’s rejection of IIED liability was 
based largely on the ground that the liability was a reaction to the content 
of Westboro’s speech, as well as on the ground that the tort was 
unconstitutionally vague as applied to public-issue speech.
413
  But these 
two objections would not necessarily apply to other kinds of laws that 
imposed civil liability.  For example, a legislature might enact a law 
establishing a specific buffer zone around funerals and providing that 
violators should be subject not only to criminal penalties but also to civil 
liability for any injuries caused to other individuals by the violation.  Such 
a law would not be content-based, nor would it be vague.  In this way, the 
legislature could grant families a remedy for the harms caused by intrusive 
funeral protests without raising the concerns that led the Court to overturn 
the damages award in Snyder.
414
    
                                                                                                                          
410 Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1220 (2011). 
411 See id. at 1219. 
412 See id. at 1219–20 (holding only that “the captive audience doctrine” should not be 
“expand[ed]” to apply “to the circumstances presented here”). 
413 See id. at 1219 (“In a case such as this, a jury is unlikely to be neutral with respect to the 
content of [the] speech, posing a real danger of becoming an instrument for the suppression  
of . . . vehement caustic, and sometimes unpleasan[t] expression.” (alterations in original) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
414 Congress has now provided such a remedy in cases governed by federal law.  The HAVA 
provides that “[a]ny person, including a surviving member of the deceased person’s immediate family, 
who suffers injury as a result of conduct that violates” the Act may sue the violator for damages.  
Honoring America’s Veterans and Caring for Camp Lejeune Families Act of 2012, Pub. L. 112-154,  
§ 601(b), (c), 126 Stat. 1165, slip law at 1, 31, 32–33, 34 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1388(c)(3) and 38 
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IX.  CONCLUSION 
Snyder v. Phelps appears to strike an important blow for the First 
Amendment freedom of speech by making clear that it encompasses even 
the most unpopular and offensive kinds of expression.  As I have tried to 
show, however, the decision is deeply problematic for several reasons.  To 
begin with, the Court fundamentally misunderstands the nature of 
Westboro’s expression.  The majority maintains that “Westboro’s choice to 
conduct its picketing [near Matthew Snyder’s funeral] did not alter the 
nature of its speech,” which was primarily intended to communicate with 
the public on matters of public concern.
415
  But Westboro’s members did 
not regard themselves as merely holding a demonstration that was 
“planned to coincide” with the funeral.416  Instead, they announced that 
they would “picket [the] funeral” in order to proclaim that Matthew was 
“[n]ow in Hell” and to convey a message of God’s hatred not only to the 
public in general but also to his family, friends, and religious 
community.
417
  And as the record shows, Matthew’s father received this 
message loud and clear.   
In this way, the Court fails to recognize the human meaning of 
Westboro’s picketing—the meaning that it had for those who engaged in it 
as well as for those who were targeted by it.  The Court also fails to 
appreciate the human impact of the speech.  Although the majority 
acknowledges that the picketing caused great distress, it attributes that 
distress to offense at Westboro’s ideology, rather than to the profound 
personal attack that the group leveled against Matthew Snyder and his 
family. 
The deepest problem with Snyder is that it reinforces a theme that has 
become increasingly prevalent in our jurisprudence—the notion that the 
First Amendment requires us to protect public speech regardless of how 
insulting, abusive, or degrading it may be.  According to the Court, we 
must take this position in order to avoid any “potential interference with a 
                                                                                                                          
U.S.C. § 2413(c)(3)).  The injured party may opt to recover either (1) actual damages or (2) “statutory 
damages” in an amount between $25,000 and $50,000 for each violation.  18 U.S.C. § 1388(d); 38 
U.S.C. § 2413(d).  Although actual damages should be deemed constitutional for the reasons I have 
given, statutory damages are more problematic.  For example, in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 
323 (1974), the Court held that presumed damages may not be awarded in defamation actions for 
statements on matters of public concern unless the statements meet the New York Times standard of 
knowing or reckless falsity.  See id. at 349–50.  A court that reviewed the HAVA’s constitutionality 
would have to determine whether a similar doctrine should apply to its provisions on statutory 
damages, and if so, whether the doctrine was satisfied by the mens rea requirements set forth in  
§§ 1388(a) and 2413(a), see supra text accompanying notes 401–05, as qualified by the rebuttable 
presumption discussed in supra note 409. 
415 Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1217, 1220.  
416 Id. at 1220. 
417 Westboro, News Release, supra note 95. 
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meaningful dialogue of ideas.”418  As the case of funeral picketing makes 
clear, however, this view is ultimately self-defeating, for a meaningful 
dialogue is possible only when the participants show one another at least a 
minimal level of respect.  In this way, the Court’s approach not only 
negates the law’s protections for individual personality, but also 
undermines the practical and normative conditions for public discourse 
itself.   
This Article has offered an alternative theory of the First Amendment.  
That theory holds that the same values that support freedom of speech also 
give rise to other fundamental rights, including privacy, dignity, emotional 
well-being, and other facets of what Justice Brandeis called the right to “an 
inviolate personality.”419  Westboro’s funeral picketing invades those rights 
in the most blatant manner by intentionally interfering with the mourners’ 
ability to bury a loved one in peace.  Although Snyder largely precludes the 
use of tort law to protect these rights, it does suggest that buffer-zone laws 
may be enacted for this purpose.  Imposing reasonable restrictions on 
funeral picketing would not undermine our constitutional commitment to 
freedom of expression, but instead would reaffirm the values of human 
freedom and dignity on which it is based.  
 
 
                                                                                                                          
418 Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1215 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
419 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 217, at 205. 
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